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A bstract
The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered (or formal) employment are a first order policy concern in developing and middle income countries. Means tests de­term ine eligibility w ith respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit a t some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax  -  a notch -  th a t results in a strong disincentive for formal employment, and there is extensive evidence on its effects. We study an income-tested program  in Uruguay and extend this literature by developing an anatom y of the behavioral responses to this program  and by establishing its welfare implications in full. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program ’s eligibility rule. We rely on information on the universe of applicants to the program  for the period 2004-2012 (about 400,000 individuals) from the program ’s records, from adm inistrative data  on registered employment from the social security adm inistration, and from a complementary follow-up survey with information on informal work.We construct the anatom y of the program ’s effects along four dimensions. F irst, we establish th a t, as predicted by the theory, beneficiaries respond to the program ’s incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find substantial heterogeneity in these effects: the program  induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation -  those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program, probably because they have limited opportunities in the labor mar- ket to begin with. Third, the follow-up survey allows us to establish th a t the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent (about two thirds) to an increase in unregistered employ­ment, and to a lesser extent (about one third) to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7. These results imply a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program  of about 3.2% of to ta l registered labor income.
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1 In trodu ction
The incentive effects of social assistance programs on labor supply have been at the center 
of the debate on economic policy in developed countries. In developing and middle income 
countries, besides the effects of these programs on labor supply, the potential disincentives to 
registered (or formal) employment is an additional concern because labor market informality 
is a major policy issue, for at least four reasons. First, the underground sector in developing 
economies represents on average a third of the official economy (Schneider, Buehn, and Mon­
tenegro, 2010) Second, access to social insurance for workers and their families is typically 
tied to formal jobs (Levy, 2008; Levy and Schady, 2013). Third, unregistered employment 
entails lower reporting of income and thus lower payroll and income tax collection. Fourth, 
a larger informal sector could lead to a variety of market distortions and efficiency losses, 
and can limit productivity growth and economic development (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014; 
Meghir, Narita, and Robin, 2015).
Empirical research on developed countries includes a sizable literature on the welfare 
impact of these labor supply incentive effects, their underlying mechanisms, their magnitude, 
and the groups of the population most affected by them. These studies have generated a 
series of anatomies of the incentive effects of social assistance programs on labor supply. 
The anatomies have, in turn, provided key inputs used in the design of welfare reforms to 
minimize efficiency losses (Scholz and Levin, 2001). A growing body of empirical literature 
has examined these effects in developing and middle income countries, motivated in part 
by the widespread implementation of social assistance programs over the last two decades.1 
The debate in these countries, and in particular in Latin America (Levy, 2008; Levy and 
Schady, 2013), has focused primarily on disincentives to registered employment. These 
disincentives are unintended consequences of the programs and are largely related to the 
difficulties of targeting in contexts of high labor informality and poor enforcement of tax 
and labor regulations.2 To determine eligibility for social assistance programs, policymakers 
often rely on earnings from registered employment, which are reported on a periodic basis 
to tax and social security authorities. Since governments can only verify earnings from 
registered employment, the income test in means-tested programs implies that benefits are 
withdrawn above a certain threshold of formal income, which generates a discrete fall in 
households’ disposable income at the cutoff level. This implicit taxation at the threshold 
-  a notch in beneficiaries’ budget constraints -  creates a strong disincentive for registered
Gn the literature on welfare systems in developing countries, these types of programs are known as conditional cash-transfer programs (CCTs). See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for a review of social assistance programs in Latin America and the Caribbean, and for an evaluation of their im pact on family consumption patterns, education, child labor and health, among other outcomes.2Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) estim ate th a t approxim ately 56 percent of wage earners in Latin Amer- ica are informal workers -  i.e., there are no payroll taxes and social security contributions associated to these jobs, and thus workers do not receive social insurance benefits such as health and old-age pension coverage.
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employment, since individuals can keep the benefit (or gain eligibility) by lowering their 
verifiable earnings from registered employment, either by reducing hours worked in formal 
employment (intensive margin response) or by exiting from registered employment (extensive 
margin response).
There is already ample evidence of social assistance programs inducing reductions in 
registered employment (see Bosch and Manacorda 2012 for an comprehensive review). Most 
existing studies, however, document negative impacts on formal work from different programs 
but do not characterize these effects and the programs’ welfare implications in full. We 
attempt to fill this gap in the existing literature by developing an anatomy of the effects 
of a social assistance program in the context of widespread labor market informality. We 
characterize the extensive margin behavioral responses of recipients of an income-tested 
program in Uruguay, the Asignaciones Familiares-Plan de Equidad (hereafter, AFAM).3 We 
construct the anatomy of the program’s effects along four dimensions. First, we establish 
whether beneficiaries respond to the program’s incentives by reducing their levels of registered 
employment, as predicted by the theory.
Second, we establish empirically which groups of individuals are the most responsive 
to these incentives, and most importantly, we illustrate the heterogeneity of responses by 
studying how the effects vary across the distribution of individuals’ propensities to be em- 
ployed formally. Previous studies have focused on mean effects, or on heterogeneous effects 
according to socio-economic and demographic characteristics, but a fuller picture -  and a 
key input for policy design -  requires the analysis of the distribution of effects beyond the 
mean impact.
Third, we analyze the margins along which individuals respond to the program’s financial 
incentives. Finding an impact on formal employment is an important result because it sheds 
light on the relevant margins of response in developing countries, but it is also necessary to 
decompose this main effect in terms of the impact on labor supply and informality. The cash 
benefit might induce a reduction in labor supply when individuals drop out of the labor force. 
Alternatively, individuals might keep working, but they might do so as informal workers to 
reduce verifiable income (i.e., earnings from registered employment) and avoid the loss of 
the benefit.
Finally, we quantify the responses to the program’s financial incentives by computing 
the elasticity of labor force participation as a function of the implicit tax on registered 
employment induced by the program. While the impact of the informality effects on tax 
collection can be informative (see for instance Bergolo and Cruces, 2014), measurement of 
the relevant elasticities is crucial for a full welfare analysis that quantifies the efficiency
3While AFAM’s design implies a potential effect on the intensive margin of labor supply, we concentrate on the extensive m argin of response. Unlike Kleven and Waseem (2013) or Kline and Tartari (2016), we are unable to  measure (local) labor supply effects a t the intensive margin since our data  does not cover hours worked nor earnings (see Section 4).
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costs of social assistance programs. We estimate the elasticity of participation in registered 
employment and use it as an input to compute the efficiency losses from the program, and 
the potential welfare gains from changes in its design.
Our empirical approach exploits a specific feature of the AFAM program’s eligibility 
rules. Households that apply to the program must first pass an income test based on house- 
hold members’ earnings from registered employment as reported to tax and social security 
authorities. When household income is below a certain threshold, the household is subject 
to a proxy means test and assigned a score from a detailed set of socio-economic and de- 
mographic characteristics. The score is based on the household’s predicted poverty levels as 
a function of the given information.The household is deemed eligible for the program only 
if its score is above a predetermined threshold. Authorities followed this regulation very 
closely, creating a sharp discontinuity in the likelihood of participation at the cutoff point. 
Because the eligibility score is based on a non-linear combination of a large set of household 
characteristics collected before participation in the program, and neither the algorithm nor 
the level of the threshold were disclosed by the authorities, applicants were unable to ma- 
nipulate the assignment rule to gain entry into the program. This sharp discontinuity in the 
AFAM assignment rule provides a credible identification strategy to analyze the applicants’ 
behavioral responses to the program’s financial incentives. We rely on a regression disconti­
nuity design which amounts to a local randomized experiment that compares labor market 
outcomes for adults in applicant households just above (i.e., the treatment group) and just 
below (i.e., the comparison group) the program eligibility threshold (Hahn et al., 2001; Lee 
and Lemieux, 2010).
Our empirical analysis relies on three matched sets of information linked through unique 
individual identifiers. The AFAM administrative records contain baseline socio-economic 
and demographic information from the program’s application process. We have information 
for all individuals in households that applied to the program (whether they gained entry 
or not) during the period January 2008 to September 2010. We use national identification 
numbers to match the adults in the applicant households to their registered employment 
work histories, constructed from data provided by Uruguay’s social security administration 
(SSA), which is responsible for collecting and recording payroll taxes and social security con- 
tributions from registered employment. This method provides a rich longitudinal database 
that covers all spells of registered employment for individuals in the program for the period 
January 2005 to December 2012. As is usually the case with social security administrative 
records in developing countries, this data only covers formal (or registered) employment 
spells; thus, it is not possible to determine whether indinviduals not engaged in formal em­
ployment are not working or engaged in informal (or unregistered) employment based on 
this data alone. We overcome this limitation by matching the administrative records with a 
detailed follow-up survey of eligible and ineligible households that applied to AFAM, which
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was designed and implemented specifically for the evaluation of the impact of the program. 
This combined data provides detailed information on registered employment, informal work 
and non-employment for each household member in eligible and ineligible households.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, as predicted by the theory, beneficiaries 
respond to the program’s incentives. We find a reduction of registered employment for adults 
in eligible households of about 8 percentage points, a fall of 15 percent compared to adults 
in households below the eligibility score. This reduction is larger for household heads, for 
women, for adults in single-headed households, and for younger individuals.
Second, we find a marked heterogeneity in these effects. We establish each individual’s 
propensity to work as a registered employee as a function of her observable baseline char- 
acteristics and pre-application registered employment histories. We find that the program 
has a stronger negative effect for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered 
employee, a smaller negative and significant effect for those with a higher probability, and 
an even smaller but not significant effect for those with a low probability. These results 
suggest some form of segmentation among potential beneficiaries, in which those with a low 
probability to work formally do not respond much to the financial incentives of the program 
because they have limited opportunities to work as registered employees to begin with, inde- 
pendent of AFAM eligibility. The opposite is true for those with a high propensity to work 
formally: they are not affected by the program’s disincentive for registered employment, 
probably because they will work formally regardless. The group with the middle propensity 
to be formally employed seems to be the one closer to the margin of choice between formal 
and informal employment, and thus individuals in this group are those who react the most 
to the new incentives.
Third, the evidence from the matched follow-up household survey data is very informative 
about the relevant margins of adjustment. Our results indicate that the observed reduction 
in registered employment induced by the program can be attributed to a larger extent (about 
two thirds) to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent (about one 
third) to a shift towards non-employment. These results are compatible with the presence of 
both an income effect and a shift towards informal employment induced by the means test, 
with the latter effect accounting for a larger share of the response.
The fourth and final dimension of our anatomy of behavioral responses to AFAM re- 
quired the quantification of the program’s effects in terms of elasticities. Our results indicate 
an average elasticity of participation in registered employment with respect to the net-of- 
participation in registered employment tax rate of 1.689. This implies that a reduction of 
1 percent in the net-of-tax share of income that individuals are permitted to keep reduces 
registered employment by about 1.7 percent. Consistent with the estimated effects of the 
program for the different subgroups, the elasticity is substantially higher (about 2.6) for 
those with a medium propensity to work as a registered employee, compared to an elasticity
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of 1.67 for those with a low propensity to work formally and an elasticity of 0.76 for those 
in the group with a high propensity to work formally. These results reflect the fact that the 
middle group is the most responsive to changes in the tax and transfer schedule. Since the 
informality margin accounts for two thirds of the effect, a back of the envelope calculation 
indicates a participation elasticity of about 0.56, in line with the results in the literature 
for developed countries, with about 1.14 corresponding to the formal-informal margin of 
adjustment. Using this elasticity and the implicit tax rates, we find that the behavioral 
responses to AFAM imply a deadweight loss (or efficiency cost) of about 3.2 percent of to­
tal labor income. As a benchmark, Eissa, Kleven, and Claus Kreiner (2006) find that the 
welfare gains from extensive margin changes induced by the Earned Income Tax Credit and 
the 1986 tax reform in the United States range from 3.27 percent to 7.64 percent of wage 
income. The efficiency cost from AFAM for the representative agent thus seems significant 
but not exceedingly large.
Our paper is primarily related to a large body of literature on the effects of social assis­
tance programs on labor market behavior. A large body of research for developed economies 
has studied how individuals respond to welfare policies, in particular, on the labor sup­
ply margin (see for instance the surveys in Moffitt, 2003, Ben-Shalom et al., 2011). The 
responses along additional margins, such as registered and unregistered employment, have 
received less attention in the literature on developed countries, although there is some evi­
dence that programs that subsidize work based on declared earnings, such as the EITC in 
the United States, induce low income individuals to shift hours from informal to registered 
employment (Gunter 2013), in particular among the self-employed (LaLumia, 2009). As 
discussed above, a series of studies based on credible identification strategies have analyzed 
the labor market responses to conditional cash transfer programs in developing countries, 
specifically in regards to labor supply (Alzua et al., 2012, Banerjee et al., 2015, Imbert and 
Papp, 2015), registered employment (Amarante et al., 2011), and choices between formal 
and informal work (Garganta and Gasparini, 2015). We provide additional evidence to con- 
firm that individuals in developing countries respond to the tax and transfer schedule in 
their labor market behavior (Behrman, 1999, Levy, 2008, Meghir, Narita, and Robin, 2015), 
thus contributing to studies of policy interventions that use quasi-experimental designs to 
infer the extent to which individuals move across formal and informal sectors (Bosch and 
Campos-Vazquez, 2014). We add to this literature by separating the effects along the em­
ployment and formal/informal margins. Araujo et al. (2016)’s study of the Bono Solidario in 
Ecuador also relies on matched administrative and household survey data and disentangles 
these margins, finding that most of the effect is due to movements from formal to informal 
work, although these results are based on data for women only. Our evidence is suggestive 
that both margins are at play, at least when considering the population of low income adults 
in Uruguay. Our analysis also adds to the literature in terms of the heterogeneity of effects.
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While we find, as others have (e.g., Amarante et al., 2011, Araujo et al., 2016), that women 
react more to the program’s incentives, we extend the analysis to subgroups of the population 
according to their propensity to work as formal employees. Our results uncover significant 
heterogeneity along this dimension. These findings are relevant to the design of these types 
of programs. For instance, specific incentives or conditionalities that are costly to monitor 
(such as minimum working hours requirements) may only be worthwhile for those who might 
be expected to react to the program’s incentives. Finally, our study also contributes an in- 
novation to the existing literature on developing countries by computing the elasticity of 
participation implied by the program’s financial incentives and deducing the welfare effects 
of the behavioral responses to the policy.
This study is also related to a growing literature that uncovers the distribution of re­
sponses to social assistance programs. The importance of documenting impacts beyond the 
mean has been illustrated by Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes (2006), Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner 
(2008) and Bargain and Doorley (2011), among others. As stressed by Eissa, Kleven, and 
Kreiner (2008), welfare analysis varies substantially when it allows for heterogeneous elas- 
ticities for different groups, and as we discussed in the previous paragraph, the design of 
programs in developing countries can also be optimized by taking this heterogeneity into 
account.
Our results add to a body of evidence on the participation elasticity of low-income groups. 
First, we provide novel results based on credible and well-identified quasi-experimental ev­
idence, which is still relatively scarce (Chetty et al., 2013), especially for developing and 
low income countries. Second, our analysis is the first for a developing country (that we 
are aware of) that computes the elasticity of participation in registered employment, a key 
margin of adjustment. As discussed above, based on very different populations and very 
different tax and transfer systems and reforms, our estimate of the average participation 
elasticity is within the range of previous results in the literature for developed countries (see 
for instance the review by Eissa, Kleven, and Claus Kreiner, 2006).
Finally, our results illustrate how a full analysis of the anatomy of responses to a social 
assistance program can inform the policy debate about the design of optimal redistributive 
programs in developing countries, just as the analysis of similar programs in developed 
countries provided valuable inputs for welfare reform (Saez, 2002, Laroque, 2005). The first 
generation of conditional cash transfer programs targeted at very poor rural areas was shown 
not to have sizable effects on recipients’ labor market outcomes (Alzua, Cruces, and Ripani, 
2012; Banerjee et al., 2015), but these programs are being scaled-up and their coverage 
broadened to urban areas, where their compatibility with registered work becomes a first 
order policy concern. There is thus an even stronger case for establishing anatomies of this 
type, as they can serve as an input for the design for the next generation of programs in 
developing countries.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the context of Uruguay’s social pro- 
tection system, the AFAM program and its rules and characteristics. Section 3 discusses the 
expected effects from AFAM on the participants’ labor market outcomes. Section 4 describes 
the data sources and the construction of the datasets we employ in our empirical analysis. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical approach and the details of the regression discontinuity 
design which is the basis of our identification strategy. Section 6 presents the main results 
on registered employment responses to the program, Section 7 establishes its distributional 
effects in terms of participants’ propensities to work formally, and Section 8 decomposes the 
main effects in informality and non-employment responses. Finally, Section 9 computes the 
elasticity of participation in registered employment, and the efficiency costs of the program’s 
disincentives. Conclusions follow.
2 Background: T he A FA M  Program  and its C harac­
ter istics
2.1 Social Insurance and Social A ssistan ce  P rogram s in U ruguay
Uruguay has one of the oldest and most developed social protection systems in Latin Amer­
ica. This system follows a contributive, European Bismark-type model, where access to 
most welfare and social insurance programs is linked to registered employment and financed 
through payroll taxes and contributions from both employers and employees. Registered (or 
formal) employees are those working in firms which reported them to the Social Security Ad- 
ministration (henceforth, SSA) and for which they paid the relevant taxes and contributions. 
Registered (or formal) employees are those working for employers that have reported them 
to the Social Security Administration (henceforth, SSA) and for whom relevant taxes and 
contributions are paid. Formal status makes these workers eligible for social insurance ben­
efits such as health and unemployment insurance, sickness and disability benefits, maternity 
leave, family allowances, and old age pensions.
As in many middle-income countries, enforcement of labor market regulations is far from 
universal. There is widespread non-compliance with social insurance regulations and evasion 
of payroll taxes is quite pervasive. This means that a substantial fraction of employees are not 
registered with the SSA and thus not covered by social insurance benefits. Unregistered (or 
informal) workers in Uruguay represented about a quarter of the total of salaried employees 
in the decade of 2000 (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2009), and about 55 percent among AFAM 
beneficiaries in 2008, when the program was implemented (calculated using microdata from 
Uruguay’s national household survey). In addition, about a quarter of AFAM beneficiaries 
aged 18-64 years old were out of the labor force in 2008, thereby without coverage of social
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insurance benefits.
A severe economic crisis hit Uruguay in 2002-2003. Unregistered workers lacked access to 
the risk-coping mechanisms provided by the SSA, and they were especially hit by this crisis. 
As a response to this increase in the economic vulnerability of the population, the government 
launched a series of reforms to the social protection system to expand the coverage of social 
assistance programs.4 In particular, the government launched a temporary social assistance 
program called Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) in 2005. This 
program, which targeted the poorest 10 percent of households in Uruguay, provided a cash 
transfer conditional on a series of health and education controls for children in beneficiary 
households.5 This emergency program was replaced in January 2008 by a new system of 
family allowances (Law 18.227), the AFAM program, as part of a broader progressive tax and 
transfer system reform.AFAM, targeted at poor households with children, became the most 
important social assistance program in Uruguay in terms of both coverage and magnitude 
of the cash benefits provided.
AFAM was implemented as a means-tested conditional cash transfer (CCT) program 
targeted to households in vulnerable socioeconomic conditions with either pregnant women 
or children under 18 years old. The program’s monetary transfers are conditional to health 
checks (both for pregnant women and children) and school attendance for children in bene- 
ficiary households. At the beginning of 2008, AFAM covered 275,000 children. In 2014, the 
program reached nearly 370,000 children, about 42 percent of all children under the age of 
18 in Uruguay. The budget for the cash transfer component of program in 2013 was just over 
0.35 percent of the GDP. In terms of its relative coverage and its budget as a proportion of 
GDP, AFAM was among the largest programs of its type in Latin America.6
2.2 E lig ib ility  Process: A ssign m en t R ule and E nrollm ent
To participate in the program, households were required to complete an application form 
in which they provided an array of socio-economic information, including household charac­
teristics (address, housing conditions, dwelling type, characteristics and quality, ownership, 
access to water and sanitation, etc.), and detailed information about household members, 
such as their national identification number, education levels, labor force participation, and 
income levels.
4 Those reforms were in line with a number of policies implemented during the decade of 2000 by many countries in Latin America with the purpose of expanding social protection and non-contributive programs (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).5See M anacorda, Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) for more details on the goals, components and implemen- tation  of PANES.6For instance, Brazil’s Bolsa Familia reached almost 24 percent of the country’s population, and had a budget of 0.4 percent of GDP in 2006, whereas Mexico’s Progresa/O portunidades covered 20 percent of the population with a budget of 0.4 percent of the GDP in the same year (Bastagli, 2009).
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After completing the application form, program eligibility was determined in two steps. 
First, the household was subject to an income test: the per-capita income of the house­
hold had to be below a predetermined threshold. Crucially, the household’s income level 
was computed by combining the self-reported information on the application form and SSA 
administrative records (matched through each household member’s national identification 
number), which include the individual’s earnings from registered employment as reported 
to the tax and social insurance authorities by employers, and from other transfer programs. 
The SSA recorded the applicants’ household income as the highest between the self-declared 
income in the application form and the household’s total income as reflected in the admin­
istrative records. In 2014, the threshold was set at a monthly level of UYU 4,517 (around 
USD 196, using June 2014’s exchange rate) for households with up to two members (about 
50 percent of the monthly national minimum wage), and UYU 5,570 (about USD 242) for 
households with more than two members.
Conditional on passing the income test, households entered the second step for eligibility, 
a proxy means test. This test relied on an eligibility score calculated by program officials 
and based on the large set of socioeconomic characteristics provided by the household in the 
application form. The score’s algorithm was devised in consultation with social policy experts 
and academics, and its details were never disclosed to the public.7 Households with income 
below the threshold of the income test and with an eligibility score above a predetermined 
level were admitted to the program.
AFAM’s eligibility rules have a very important implication for our analysis. The presence 
of a cutoff level and the strict enforcement of the program’s rules by authorities generates 
a strong discontinuity in program participation rates at the cutoff point. Figure 1 plots 
the proportion of applicant households, both those deemed eligible or ineligible through the 
application process, that were enrolled into the program at any given point in time since its 
implementation in 2008, as a function of the eligibility score (see Section 4 for a description 
of the samples). We standardized the eligibility score for the figures presented in this paper: 
the eligibility cutoff is centered at zero, so that eligible households have positive scores and 
ineligible households have negative scores. The figure clearly shows a sharp discontinuity 
in the probability of participation in AFAM, which is about 96 percentage points higher
7The eligibility score was devised by researchers a t the Universidad de la Republica (UDELAR) in Montevideo, Uruguay (see Am arante and Vigorito, 2011). The algorithm  is based on the coefficients of a probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to  one if households were below the first quintile of per capita income, and zero for those above the first quintile bu t below the m edian of per capita income. The original model was estim ated by means of a fully satu rated  function of household variables drawn from the ECH national household survey. The resulting coefficient estimates were used to  predict the score for each applicant household based on data  from the application form, and the eligibility thresholds were different for residents of Montevideo, the country’s capital, and the rest of the country, to reflect differences in living costs. The com putation of the score and the m onitoring of household income and conditionalities was a responsibility of U ruguay’s Social Security Adm inistration, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), and the M inistry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social, henceforth MIDES).
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for those households with a score just above the eligibility threshold than for those just 
below it. This plausible exogenous variation in the assignment into the program due to its 
eligibility rule is the basis of our identification strategy. Our empirical analysis is based on 
the comparison of the behavior and outcomes of individuals in eligible households -  i.e., 
those with an eligibility score above the threshold -  and individuals in ineligible households 
-  i.e., those who applied with a score below the cutoff point -  as discussed in detail in Section 
5.1 below.
2.3 Level and D u ration  o f th e  A FA M  M onetary  B enefits
Households selected to participate in the program are entitled to a monthly cash transfer. 
The level of the transfer depends (non linearly) on the number of children under the age of 
18, and on the number of children attending secondary school.8 The transfer is larger for 
those in secondary school so as to encourage older children to attend and complete their 
schooling.
The total benefit granted to a household can be calculated as follows:
(1)
where Kids0to17 represents the number of children below 18 years old, HighSchooKids is 
the number of children that attend secondary school, 3 and 5 are the transfers levels, and 
T the income test’s threshold. These amounts are adjusted periodically according to the 
evolution of the official Consumer Price Index. For instance, in 2014 the transfers were set 
at 3 =UYU 1,096 (USD 48) and 5 =  UYU 470 (USD 20). The average income transfer 
for a beneficiary household with two children in 2014 was UYU 2,374 (USD 103), about 25 
percent of the monthly national minimum wage.
While households participate in the program, they receive the full transfer according to 
the program’s rules as long as their monthly income (from all sources) is lower than the pre- 
determined income eligibility threshold. If a household’s income exceeds this threshold, it 
becomes ineligible for the program and loses the entire AFAM benefit. In practice, however, 
the income test is only applied every two months and is based only on verifiable sources of 
income, i.e., labor income from registered employment, retirement pensions or other govern- 
ment transfers recorded in the SSA administrative records. Our analysis of the program’s 
administrative records for the 2008-2010 period indicates that only about 0.5 percent of ben­
eficiaries left the program for this reason. Households were also disqualified and made to exit 
the program when they failed to meet the mandatory health and school attendance checks 
for children. According to AFAM administrative records, less than 0.1 percent of the bene-
8There is also an extra component for disabled children.
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ficiaries left the program for this reason during the 2008-2010 period.9 Finally, households 
also exited the program when all of their children reached 18 years old.
3 E x p ected  E ffects o f A FA M  on Labor M arket B ehav- 
ior
Economic theory predicts that a means-tested transfer program such as AFAM could affect 
the labor market behavior of potential beneficiaries along two extensive margins of choice 
(Bosch and Manacorda, 2012). We first discuss how it may change the decisions of working- 
age eligible individuals in terms of whether to enter or exit the labor market, i.e. the labor 
force participation margin.10 It may also affect the decision to work as a formal or as an 
informal employee for both those who were employed and those who were not employed, i.e. 
the formal-informal employment margin.
3.1 A FA M  and th e Labor Force P artic ip ation  M argin
AFAM’s benefits and eligibility rules introduce strong financial incentives for individuals to 
reduce their labor force participation, as in the case of traditional welfare programs (see for 
instance, Moffitt, 2002). First, the income test entails an implicit tax on labor earnings, thus 
reducing labor supply through a substitution effect. The transfer also increases households’ 
non labor income, inducing a negative income effect. Both effects reinforce the program’s 
disincentive for labor force participation.
Besides these standard economic theory arguments based on the program’s rules and 
benefits, the program’s conditionalities might also induce changes in the labor force partic­
ipation of adults. On the one hand, the requirement that children attend school might free 
up time that adults in the household previously spent on childcare. On the other hand, if 
conditionalities are effective in curbing child labor, the net effect of transfers on households’ 
incomes is reduced, which might mitigate the program’s potential disincentive for adult labor 
supply (Alzua et al., 2012).
9The school attendance condition was enforced beginning in the year 2013. To enforce this regulation, the government cross-checked the AFAM’s beneficiary lists against school attendance records. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the program ’s adm inistrative records for the period after 2010 and thus cannot evaluate the extent to which this enforcement measure affected AFAM participation among beneficiaries.10In fact, AFAM’s design implies th a t it m ight also affect the intensive margin of labor supply. Individuals in eligible households have a strong incentive to not exceed the income te s t’s threshold level, since earnings from registered labor above this level would result in loss of the benefit (for beneficiaries) and in ineligibility (for non-beneficiaries considering applying to the program ). This implies a discrete fall in households’ incomes a t the threshold, which generates a notch in their budget constraint (Kleven, 2016). At this notch, households could increase their disposable income by reducing hours worked as formal workers and thus reducing verifiable earnings from registered employment. Unfortunately, we are unable to measure labor supply a t the intensive margin because our data  does not cover working hours or earnings (see Section 4).
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The combination of these three channels implies that the overall effect of AFAM on 
adults’ labor force participation is ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. However, 
we expect the negative response in labor force participation from the financial disincentive 
to be of first-order importance relative the more ambiguous incentives introduced by the 
conditionalities. First, as discussed above, it is not clear to what extent the government 
really enforced these conditionalities, at least during the period that we study. In fact, 
evidence from our follow-up survey suggests that about 40 percent of the beneficiaries were 
unaware of conditionalities being attached to the program (Bergolo et al., 2016). Manacorda, 
Miguel, and Vigorito (2011) also note that the conditionalities were de facto not enforced in 
the case of PANES, the program that preceded AFAM, because of the lack of coordination 
between public institutions. Second, school attendance is nearly universal for primary school 
children in Uruguay, and thus the child labor argument would only apply to teenagers and 
not to all children in the household. In fact, Amarante, Ferrando, and Vigorito (2013) did 
not find any evidence that PANES affected school attendance or child labor for children aged 
14 to 17.
3.2 A FA M  and th e Form al-Inform al E m ploym ent M argin
As argued by Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2014), there are two extreme theoretical ap- 
proaches to model the presence of informal work in an economy. The traditional view, based 
on Harris and Todaro (1970), posits that informal workers are those rationed-out from scarce 
(and “good”) formal jobs. Informality is thus considered to be a form of queuing that rep- 
resents unemployment in disguise; in this model all workers prefer to be employed as formal 
workers -  informality is not voluntary nor the result of an optimal choice from the worker. 
An alternative view, the sorting approach, advances that workers may choose to engage in 
informal employment because they place less value on the social insurance benefits tied to 
registered or formal jobs. They seek to avoid the related payroll taxes and contributions be- 
cause, in the context of weak enforcement of tax and labor regulations, informal employment 
results in better pay, among other benefits (Maloney, 1999, 2004, Levy, 2008).
The first approach implies that all workers prefer formal jobs, while in the second per- 
spective there is a continuum of individual preferences as well as a marginal worker who is 
indifferent between the option of formal or equivalent informal employment. In the context 
of segmented labor market models, a program such as AFAM would not have a discernible 
effect on the formality-informality margin, although it would increase welfare for informal 
workers. In the context of sorting models, however, AFAM’s benefits and eligibility rules 
alter the cost-benefit equation of formal work at the margin.
The available evidence indicates that programs of this type do have an impact on the 
formal-informal employment margin, which implies that at least part of the labor market
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corresponds to some form of sorting. The extent of these effects, however, is an empirical 
question. The answer depends on the context of each program, for instance, on the mass 
of workers at the margin of choice between formality and informality, on the program’s 
generosity, and on the tax rates on registered earnings implied by the eligibility conditions 
(see Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman, 2009; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2012, Bosch and 
Campos-Vazquez, 2014). In the case of AFAM, the incentives might be substantial: the 
transfer is large relative to the earnings of typical beneficiaries, the program introduces a 
high implicit marginal tax rate for earnings from registered employment at the income test 
threshold, and the program’s potential beneficiaries belong to groups that are more likely to 
engage in informal work. Moreover, it has been argued that there are two tiers of informality 
in the labor market (Fields, 2009), and we could thus expect differential effects among 
individuals with different propensities to work formally. This differential analysis constitutes 
a key feature of an anatomy of labor market responses to social assistance programs.
3.3 T estab le Im plications o f th e  T heory
The purpose of the analysis that follows is to test a set of predictions about the effect of 
AFAM on registered employment in order to create an anatomy of these behavioral responses. 
The combination of the negative income effect of the transfer and the substitution effect 
induced by the income test based on registered labor earnings yields the prediction that (1) 
the total share of eligible adults in the population in registered employment should decrease 
as a consequence of the program. Moreover, the eligibility criteria, based on formal earnings, 
mostly affects the decisions made by individuals at the margin between formal and informal 
employment. As a result, (2) the total effect on registered employment should be higher 
among individuals with higher propensities to be employed as formal workers relative to 
potential beneficiaries with lower propensities to be employed as formal workers.
The incentives introduced by the program might alter decisions at different margins of 
behavior -  individuals may drop out of the labor force (pure income effect), while others 
might transition from registered to unregistered jobs (formal/informal substitution effect). 
While we do not have information to fully test these transitions, we can still establish whether 
(3) the share of non-employed population increases and (4) the proportion of unregistered 
workers increases, which can illustrate the effects at these two margins of labor supply.11
A further component of an anatomy of behavioral responses is the quantification of 
these responses. We hypothesize that (5) the generosity of the income transfer and the large 
implicit tax incentives on formal earnings are substantial enough to induce a sizable response
11 The prediction for informal employment is a priori ambiguous because of the transfer-induced negative income effect on infra-marginal workers and the positive formal-informal substitution effect due to the implicit marginal tax  on registered employment. Consequently, a positive effect on unregistered employment indicates some adjustm ent on the formal-informal margin (Bosch and Manacorda, 2012).
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on registered employment, and that (6) the implicit elasticities will vary according to the 
propensity to be employed as formal workers, as discussed in (2), or among subgroups of 
individuals defined by their socioeconomic characteristics.
4 D a ta  Sources and Sam ple C onstruction
Our analysis is based on a series of administrative and household survey datasets matched by 
means of a unique individual identifier. This section describes the original data sources, their 
characteristics and their timeframes. It also documents the matching process, the resulting 
datasets that we use for our empirical work, and the outcomes of interest.
4.1 B aselin e Program  A p p lica tion  R ecords
The AFAM administrative records correspond to a detailed questionnaire on the socio- 
economic and demographic characteristics of all individuals in households that applied to the 
program. This rich baseline data contains information for both successful (i.e., eligible) and 
unsuccessful (i.e., ineligible) applicant households. Our database covers the period January 
2008 to September 2010.
The detailed application form was conceived to produce a targeting score, and thus in- 
cluded a host of information on the households’ living conditions. It was filled-in by BPS 
staff and a member of the applicant household. Its design was based on the typical questions 
found on household and labor force surveys. The individual and household characteris­
tics elicited by this process include demographics, schooling, labor force participation and 
income, housing conditions and durable assets ownership, and region of residence, among 
others. The records also include the date of application and, most importantly, the exact 
value of the household’s eligibility score computed by the authorities and the national iden­
tification number of each member of the household. Identity cards (“Cédula de Identidad”) 
are issued at birth and renewed periodically for all citizens of Uruguay. An individual’s na­
tional identification number corresponds to their card’s unique number. It is uniquely linked 
to tax and social security records, and it is widely used to prove identity in public offices 
and for private commercial services.
4.2 Social Security  A d m in istration  R ecords
The Social Security Administration (SSA) records the monetary contributions made by em­
ployers and employees to social insurance services every month. A formal employee is one 
that is “registered” with the SSA, and thus covered by the social security and social insur­
ance benefits provided by SSA: old age pensions, health insurance, unemployment benefits,
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maternity and child allowances, among others.
We have access to SSA records for program applicants for the period from January 
2005 to December 2012. This type of data has two main advantages. First, it records all 
episodes of registered employment (for both employees and self-employed workers, and in 
both the private and public sectors). We can thus construct a longitudinal database of 
registered employment histories by month that covers the entire period under study and, 
most importantly, substantial periods before and after the period covered by the program 
application records. We use national identification numbers to match all adult members of 
applicant households to their registered employment histories and their baseline application 
records. The second advantage of this data is that it provides information on the entire 
universe of adults in applicant households, which results in a large dataset that allows for a 
high degree of precision in our estimates.
Finally, in terms of limitations, our SSA administrative data does not include information 
on hours worked per day (or days per month) nor on earnings from registered work, which 
means that we cannot determine the impact of AFAM on the intensive margin of labor 
supply.
4.3 Follow -U p Survey o f A p plican ts to  th e  P rogram
An additional limitation of administrative databases for the study of labor market outcomes 
in developing countries is that, by definition, these sources do not have any information 
about unregistered or informal employment. Individuals typically appear in these databases 
as working as registered workers for which social insurance contributions and payroll taxes 
are paid, since the main purpose of these databases is to determine eligibility for social in­
surance benefits. In some cases, as in our data for Uruguay, individuals may also appear 
as beneficiaries of social assistance programs -  typically child-related cash transfers or un- 
employment insurance. Individuals that do not appear in the database may thus be either 
inactive, unemployed (and not receiving unemployment insurance payments), or working 
as unregistered or informal employees. While these are good data sources to determine 
registered employment status, they do not provide a complete panorama of labor market 
outcomes since we cannot distinguish between inactivity, unemployment and unregistered 
work.
To complement the administrative data source along these lines, MIDES commissioned 
a group of researchers based at IECON12 to develop and implement a follow-up household 
survey specifically designed to study the effects of AFAM on household welfare and on indi­
12This survey was designed by researchers a t the Institu to  de Economía (IECON) of the UDELAR, in collaboration with MIDES and researchers a t the Institu te  of Statistics and in the Departm ent of Sociology a t UDELAR (Am arante and Vigorito, 2011). In order to limit strategic responses, surveyed households were not informed about the precise purpose of the survey.
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vidual labor market responses. The survey was designed with the evaluation’s identification 
strategy in mind. Since eligibility to the program was determined by a score based on so- 
cioeconomic characteristics that resulted in a sharp discontinuity at the cut-off point, the 
survey’s sampling frame was based on a random sample of eligible and ineligible households 
that were close to the cut-off point, according to AFAM application records. Therefore, the 
survey sample was constructed to exploit the quasi-random variation generated by the eligi- 
bility rule. These application records and the corresponding household survey were matched 
using each individual’s unique national identification number.
The follow-up survey was collected from September 2011 to February 2013. Overall, 40 
percent (1,441) of the stratified random sample of 3,565 households were interviewed, with a 
slightly higher proportion of non-response among ineligible households (44 percent) relative 
to eligible households (39 percent). Despite the high-level of non-response, there is no robust 
evidence of correlation between non-response and eligibility status. For an analysis of this 
issue, see Bergolo and Galvan (2016).
The survey’s questionnaire was basically a shortened version of the Encuesta Continua 
de Hogares (the household survey carried out periodically by Uruguay’s national statistical 
agency). It covered a host of information on household living conditions and individual labor 
market outcomes. More specifically, it allows us to establish the mutually exclusive labor 
market outcomes at the date of the interview -  i.e., registered and unregistered employment, 
unemployment and non-participation -  for each individual in the sample.
4.4 M atched  D a ta se ts  for th e  E m pirical A nalysis
From these data sources, we construct two related but distinct datasets for our empirical 
analysis. For our first dataset, we match the program application records with SSA’s regis­
tered employment work histories. We thus have complete registered work trajectories for the 
period January-2005-December 2012 for all adult individuals in households that applied to 
the program between January 2008 and September 2010. We adjust this data to the fact that 
application to AFAM occurs at different moments through the period we study (Appendix 
Figure A.1 depicts this distribution over time). Our analysis focuses on post-application 
employment outcomes -  specifically, we study the period between 1 and up to 54 months 
after the application date.13 We also exploit the longitudinal dimension of the data and 
construct detailed pre-application registered employment trajectories for all adults in our 
sample for the 36 months immediately preceding application.14 Similarly to an event study,
13We use information up to 54 m onths after application to the program  because only a small number of individuals are observed for 60 months, the maximum post-application window in our setup.14We have more than  36 m onths of pre-application data  for individuals who applied later in our observation window. We preferred to standardize the pre-application window to the minimum common denom inator of 36 m onths (i.e., January 2005-January 2008 for the earliest applicants to the program).
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we re-center the work histories at the time of application to the program for individuals in 
both eligible and ineligible households.
The population of interest consists of heads of households or spouses of heads of house- 
holds aged 18 to 57 at the time of the AFAM application during the period January 2008 
to September 2010. These age limits restrict our sample to the economically active pop­
ulation over our whole period of study.15 In addition to the age restriction, we exclude a 
small proportion of individuals for whom the available data does not allow us to establish 
eligibility or treatment status (6.07 percent of the population of adults in applicant house­
holds). Finally, we exclude individuals whose household eligibility score is misreported in 
the AFAM application records (0.48 percent out of the population). These restrictions yield 
a population of 241,092 individuals aged 18-57 at the time of application to AFAM. Since 
our identification strategy is based on the sharp discontinuity of the eligibility at the cut-off 
point in a regression discontinuity setting, we restrict our analysis to a sample of the popu- 
lation of applicants in households in a specific range of (-0.1; +0.1) of the eligibility score.16 
From the population of 241,092 adults in all applicant samples, we use a sample (henceforth, 
the main sample) of about 10 percent of the total -  24,563 observations (18,790 eligible and 
5,773 ineligible).
The second dataset (henceforth, the follow-up sample) covers the adult individuals in 
households interviewed for the follow-up survey during the period September 2011- February 
2013. As described above, these households were also drawn from those close to the eligibility 
cut-off in the AFAM application records.17 There are 2,544 adults (18-57) interviewed in the 
follow-up survey (1,736 eligible individuals and 808 ineligibles). We match these individuals 
and their households with the information in the program application records and with their 
registered employment work histories from the SSA administrative records.
Because of how these samples were selected, we should expect individuals in the main 
sample to be similar to those in the follow-up sample, since both groups were drawn from 
a relatively small interval of the eligibility score around its cut-off point. However, we 
can also expect these two groups to differ from the full population of applicants: because 
they were close to the cut-off, these individuals represent the more well-off (as proxied 
by the eligibility score). This is verified in Table 1, which presents summary statistics of 
selected socio-economic characteristics of adult (18-57) individuals in all applicant households
15The lower bound for the age reflects the fact th a t individuals under 18 would not have benefited from the program  as eligible children (e.g., they were not required to be enrolled in school). The restriction at 57 years old is due to the fact th a t workers in Uruguay are eligible for retirem ent benefits a t 60. For the last period of our work histories data, none of the workers were older than  59.16 The range of the standardized eligibility score for the population of all applicant households is (-0 .268;+ 0.712), where positive values represent eligible (and thus less well-off) households and negative values correspond to non-eligible households.17The optim al bandw idth for the survey was set a t the eligibility score interval of [-0.0426;+0.0727]. This implies th a t the households selected were those with predicted probabilities of falling below the target income level within 7.27 percentage points and minus 4.26 percentage points of the cutoff point.
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(column 1), of those from the main sample (column 2) and from individuals in the follow-up 
sample (column 3). There do not seem to be substantial systematic differences between the 
characteristics in columns 2 and 3. However, households and individuals in our two selected 
groups differ from those in the full population in some key characteristics. For instance, in 
our two samples there is a substantially smaller proportion of female heads (77.08 percent 
in the main sample and 79.71 percent in the follow-up sample, compared to 72.89 percent in 
the full population), the education level is higher (30 percent and 26.69 percent compared 
to 50.76 with only primary school) there are less children in the households (1.42 and 1.40 
compared to 2.09), and there are far less former beneficiaries of the PANES emergency 
cash transfer program, which targeted the extreme poor (42.43 percent and 10.37 percent 
compared to 9.51 percent). In Section 6.4, we assess to what extent the baseline RD estimates 
are generalizable to the full population of adults in AFAM applicant households.
4.5 O utcom es o f In terest
The outcomes that we consider are defined as follows. The key outcome is registered em- 
ployment as recorded in SSA administrative data. Specifically, registered employment in our 
data is an indicator variable equal to one if the individual is registered with the SSA in a 
given calendar month, and zero otherwise.
The analysis in Section 8 is based on the follow-up sample, and we exploit the informa- 
tion from the survey to explore responses to AFAM on additional margins of labor force 
participation. The first is registered employment, based in the response to a specific ques- 
tion in the follow-up survey and defined as an indicator coded as one for individuals who 
declared to be a registered employee at the time of the interview and zero otherwise.18 The 
second outcome of interest for our study is unregistered employment, again as stated by the 
respondent in the follow-up survey. This is an indicator coded as one for individuals who 
work but state that they are not registered with the SSA, and zero otherwise. The third 
outcome is non-employment, which is an indicator variable equal to one when the individual 
declares that she is not working, and zero when she states that she is employed (either as a 
registered or as an unregistered worker).
18The specific question in the ECH and in our follow-up survey is: “Are you contributing to a retirem ent benefit through this job?” (“¿A porta a alguna caja de jubilaciones por su trabajo  actual?”). This is a standard criteria in the analysis of household surveys in Latin America. It is used to define registered or formal work in most of the recent literature for the region — see, for instance, Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) and Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012).
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5 Em pirical A pproach
5.1 E m pirical Strategy: th e  R egression  D iscon tin u ity  D esign
Our Identification strategy to estimate the causal effect of the AFAM program on labor 
market outcomes relies on a regression discontinuity design based on the program’s eligi- 
bility rule. Our sharp RD strategy exploits the fact that assignment to the program was 
determined by a deterministic eligibility score (score), which was a function of applicant 
households’ characteristics. Only households with scores above the eligibility threshold were 
eligible for the program.19 We standardize this score so that the eligibility threshold is zero, 
positive values imply that households were eligible, and negative values imply that house- 
holds were deemed ineligible. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 1: the discontinuity in the 
probability of program participation at the threshold is 96 percentage points, implying that 
the enforcement of the eligibility rule was very strict.
In this type of RD setting, ineligible households far to the left of the eligibility cutoff dif- 
fer substantially in observable characteristics from eligible households far to the right of the 
threshold. However, if we narrow the focus to individuals in the neighborhood of the eligibil­
ity threshold, it is plausible that assignment to the program was determined by idiosyncratic 
factors and not by systematic differences in household and individual characteristics that 
might also be correlated to labor market behavior. Under certain conditions, individuals 
in households with a value of the eligibility score just below the cutoff (i.e., they were not 
deemed eligible by a small margin) can serve as a plausible counterfactual for individuals 
who gained eligibility by a small margin, and the RD setting is akin to a local randomized 
experiment.
For our baseline RD analysis, we estimate a regression model within a narrow window 
around the AFAM eligibility threshold specified as follows:
19See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a detailed revision of technical issues relative to the RD design.
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where Yi is the outcome of interest for individual i ; ELE G í is a dummy equal to one if the 
individual belongs to an applicant household eligible for the program (i.e. if scorei> 0), 
and zero otherwise; and score is the value of the eligibility score, which as usual in the RD 
literature is standardized relative to the eligibility threshold (c). The function f  (scorei) is 
a smooth control function of the “assignment” variable score. The parameter of interest, 3, 
captures the causal effect of AFAM on the outcome of interest. When the analysis focuses 
on the main sample, which is a longitudinal database, standard errors are clustered at the 
individual level to account for serial correlation of individual outcomes over time. When we
(2)
use the follow-up sample, our estimates are based on regressions with Huber-White robust 
standard errors.
The functional form of f  (.) and the window on each side of the cutoff threshold are key 
inputs for the RD design. Our baseline RD specification uses a low-order polynomial ap­
proach (linear and quadratic) to control for the assignment variable.20 These polynomials 
are estimated separately on each side of the eligibility threshold. As discussed above, our 
main sample is based on a bandwidth of ±0.1 around the cutoff threshold of the standard- 
ized eligibility score. In the Appendix, we provide a full set of robustness and specification 
checks of our main results, including alternative functional form assumptions for f  (.), dif­
ferent choices of bandwidths,21 RD estimations based on local linear regression, estimations 
including time fixed effects, and alternative standard error estimates, among others.
The identification of the parameter 3 as a causal effect in an RD setting requires a series 
of conditions to be met. In terms of the Rubin causal model, let Yi(1) and 1¿(0) denote the 
potential outcomes for eligible and ineligible individuals respectively. Identification in our 
RD design requires that E  [Yi(1) | score] and E  [Y (0) | score] are continuous functions at the 
eligibility threshold c. This continuity condition justifies the use of those very close to the 
threshold as a counterfactual for those at the other side of the cutoff -  i.e., the differences 
between the two groups are plausibly exogenous. Since ELEG is a discontinuous function of 
the eligibility score, and the control function f  (.) in equation 2 is by assumption continuous 
at c, the RD coefficient 3 is identified if the continuity condition is met. Intuitively, the 
continuity assumption implies that any discontinuity in the outcome of interest as a function 
of the score at the cutoff c can be attributed to the causal impact of AFAM eligibility.
This continuity assumption would be violated if individuals were able to manipulate 
the program’s eligibility process. In that case, the difference between the eligible and the 
ineligible at the threshold would reflect some systematic advantage of the eligible, instead 
of being determined by plausibly exogenous idiosyncratic factors. This would happen, for 
instance, if program officials favored households with adults engaged in informal jobs, or 
if applicants lied about their socioeconomic characteristics when filling-in the application 
form as a strategy to gain eligibility. Either situation would introduce systematic differences 
between observable unobservable characteristics of individuals just above and just below the 
eligibility threshold, potentially biasing the estimates.
Table 2 provides some evidence consistent with the absence of manipulation of the as­
signment variable. The table presents the average of selected socioeconomic characteristics
20Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue against the use of higher-order polynomials in RD designs.21For our baseline specification, we selected the more parsimonious ±0.1 bandw idth. The Appendix reports results based on a standard set alternative samples, which correspond to restricting the bandw idth to ranges of ±0.02, ±0.05, ±0.15, ±0.2 and ±0.073 of the eligibility score. The la tter is the optimal bandw idth computed as in Imbens and K alyanaram an (2012), which corresponds to local linear regressions and a triangular kernel density th a t assigns a higher weight to observations closer to the threshold.
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at baseline for eligible and ineligible individuals in our main sample. Column (1) and (2) re- 
port the mean value of each characteristic for eligible and ineligible individuals, respectively, 
and column (3) reports the p-value of the differences in means. The raw differences between 
the means of most variables are statistically significant at standard levels, as indicated by 
the low p-values in column (3). However, in an RD setting, the right counterfactual for the 
treatment group in the absence of the program is not the average level of the same vari­
able for the control group. This implicitly assumes that the potential outcome curves are 
flat at the threshold, but these potential outcome curves might have slopes, as most of the 
graphical evidence indicates (see the figures in Appendix Section A.4.2). In the type of local 
randomized experiment produced by the AFAM eligibility rule, the RD specification uses 
the observed trends in the outcomes on both sides of the eligibility threshold to construct 
an appropriate counterfactual. Consistent with the absence of manipulation, most of the 
RD estimates based on equation 2 for the socioeconomic characteristics at baseline (column 
4) are not statistically significant, and the small but significant discontinuities (in age, frac- 
tion of individuals with secondary education or more, number of children and enrollment in 
PANES) are not economically large.22
To establish whether these small differences in baseline characteristics are jointly rel- 
evant and might bias our results, we estimate the combined effect of these variables on 
post-application registered employment, our key outcome. We compute predicted registered 
employment from these variables,23 and estimate our baseline RD model estimated with 
the prediction as the dependent variable (Table 2, last row, column 3) -  this regression is 
illustrates in Appendix Figure A.5, which plots predicted registered employment as a func- 
tion of the eligibility score. The slightly downward trend indicates that individuals with 
higher eligibility scores (i.e., poorer or more vulnerable individuals) have observable charac­
teristics that are associated, on average, with lower registered employment. However, there 
is no significant jump in predicted registered employment at the eligibility cutoff, which is 
confirmed by the small and not statistically significant coefficient in the last row of Table 2. 
This higher-powered test indicates that baseline characteristics appear to be jointly balanced 
despite the small discontinuities in some of the underlying variables.
A standard prediction consistent with a well identified regression discontinuity setting is 
that the distribution of the assignment variable itself should be continuous at the eligibility 
threshold when potential beneficiaries are unable to manipulate the underlying score. Panel
22 Appendix Figures A.2 through A.4 depict analogous RD plots for each baseline characteristic. To provide a more complete picture of potential discontinuities around the eligibility threshold, Appendix Tables A.2 through A.6 repeats this analysis setting the samples to the standard  set of alternative bandwidths. These additional results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported here.23Specifically, we estim ate a regression model for registered employment (R E ) in the post-application period as a function of all the baseline characteristics ( X ) in Table 2, including pre-application registered 
employment. We then use the vector of estim ated coefficients from the regression (6) to  predict post- 
application registered employment for each observation i, R E  i =  X 6.
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(a) in Figure A.6 presents the distribution of the assignment variable, the standardized 
eligibility score. There does not seem to be a major discontinuity in the fraction of applicants 
around the eligibility threshold, as manipulation of the eligibility score would imply. Panel
(b) depicts the estimates corresponding to the McCrary test -  i.e., it plots the density of 
the eligibility score and a smoothed density estimator based on a local linear regression on 
both sides of the threshold. 24 We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity: for 
our main sample, the estimated discontinuity in the density is 0.107 with a standard error 
of 0.108.
Finally, besides this empirical evidence, the institutional context of AFAM also suggests 
the absence of selective sorting and of eligibility score manipulation by either beneficiaries 
or program officials. While individuals had incentives to complete the application form 
strategically to gain eligibility, they were limited by the fact that the government did not 
disclose the algorithm to compute the score, the characteristics on which it was based, 
their underlying weights, nor the level of the eligibility threshold. Moreover, the very sharp 
and large jump in participation at the threshold illustrated in Figure 1 indicates that the 
program’s rules were strictly enforced.
Taken together, this empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that individuals were 
nearly randomized around the eligibility threshold. This implies that we can give a causal 
interpretation to any discontinuity around the threshold in labor market or other post- 
application outcomes as the effect of AFAM eligibility.
5.2 G raphical A n alysis o f R eg istered  E m ploym ent P attern s
An advantage of the RD research design is that it provides a transparent graphical repre- 
sentation of the relationship between the outcome of interest and the assignment variable 
in terms of a discontinuity at the eligibility cutoff. The patterns in Figure 2 summarize our 
main results. In each figure, we plot the unrestricted monthly registered employment means 
(blue circle) in bins of 0.5 percentage points of the score, and the estimated monthly means 
(red solid line) using a second degree polynomial model applied to each side of the cutoff 
point.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 depicts how pre-application registered employment varied around 
the AFAM eligibility threshold. There appears to be only a small jump, and this is further 
reinforced by the RD coefficient of 0.027 (as in the corresponding coefficient in Table 3, 
Panel A, second row), which is not statistically significant. This confirms the balance in pre- 
application characteristics (in this case, pre-application outcomes) between the two groups, as 
discussed in the previous section. Registered employment levels in the two groups, however,
24 The formal test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis th a t there is no discontinuity in the density of the standardized eligibility score at the eligibility cutoff.
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start to diverge significantly after application to AFAM. Panel (b) in Figure 2 displays a 
much larger jump at the eligibility threshold, and this is confirmed by the RD coefficient of 
-0.086, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. These results indicate that registered 
employment falls substantially at the eligibility cutoff, i.e. when individuals become eligible 
for the program.
It should be noted that registered employment fluctuates in the 30-40 percent range in the 
pre-application period, and in the 40-60% range in the post-application period. This is due 
to the fact that the program was launched when Uruguay’s economy was recovering from 
the severe crisis of 2005, after which employment rose substantially. The pre-application 
period is closer in time to the crisis than the post application period, and the difference in 
average registered employment for applicants in panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2 reflect the 
recovery of employment during the period we study. This does not affect the difference in 
employment levels at a given time between the eligible and the ineligible, which is the focus 
of our analysis. We present complementary evidence based on a regression discontinuity- 
difference in differences design in Section 6.2 below that controls for these underlying trends 
and yields similar results.
Finally, these figures also provide some additional evidence on registered employment 
patterns: this outcome seems to be decreasing in the eligibility score, especially for the 
ineligible (those with a negative value of the score, to the left of the cutoff). This pattern 
is consistent with previous results that show that individuals in poorer and more vulnerable 
households (as proxied by the eligibility score) have a lower propensity to engage in formal or 
registered work, and achieveworse labor market outcomes in general. We study these issues 
in more detail in the statistical analysis in the next section.
6 R eg istered  E m ploym ent R esp on se to  th e  Program
6.1 R eg istered  E m ploym ent R esp on se to  AFAM : R D  E stim ates
Panel (b) in Figure 2 illustrates the essence of the main result: AFAM generated a substantial 
fall in registered employment among its beneficiaries. In this section, we analyze this effect 
in more depth. We first turn to the detailed statistical results presented in Table 3, which 
presents the estimates of the program’s effect based on the RD specification given by equation 
2 for our main sample. Column (1) reports the coefficients of our preferred specification, 
based on a quadratic RD polynomial. Column (2), in turn, presents the results from an 
alternative specification, a linear polynomial, as a robustness check. Column (3) reports 
the average registered employment rate for ineligible individuals in the main sample (which 
we label as our control group). Column (4), in turn, presents the effect in column (1) as a 
proportion of the registered employment rate in column (3). Panel A presents the estimates
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without controls, while panel B presents equivalent results adding a standard set of covariates 
to the basic RD model.25
The coefficient in panel A, column (1) of Table 3 is the baseline result depicted in Figure 
2. We find a large and statistically significant decline of 8.6 percentage points in registered 
employment of adults eligible for AFAM compared to those ineligible in the post-application 
period. In terms of the mean outcome of the control group, this effect represents a propor- 
tional decrease of 17 percent in registered employment. The coefficient on the same model 
with registered employment in the pre-application period (column 1, panel A, second row) 
is also negative but smaller (-2.7 percent) and not statistically significant at standard levels, 
which is consistent with the previous discussion about the balance in characteristics and 
pre-treatment outcomes between the eligible and the ineligible. In terms of specification, 
all of the coefficients in column (2) of Table 3 (from the linear polynomial RD) are very 
similar to those in column (1) (based on the quadratic polynomial RD), which indicates that 
our main results are robust to this variation. However, the coefficient for pre-application 
registered employment computed with the linear RD specification (column 2, panel A, sec­
ond row) is also small (-2.5 percent) but statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The 
regressions presented in panel B of of Table 3 include controls for a series of pre-determined 
covariates. The impact on post-application registered employment is slightly smaller (-7.9 
compared to -8.7 percent -  column 1, panel B, first row) and statistically significant at the 
one percent level, with a very similar pattern for the linear specification. The coefficient for 
pre-application registered employment in the two specifications with covariates (columns 1 
and 2, panel B, second row) are smaller (-1.8 and -1.6 percent compared to -2.7 and -2.5 
percent) and not statistically significant. To control for small imbalances such as those doc- 
umented here and in Table 2 and to gain precision by reducing the residual variance, the 
results in the remainder of the paper are based on the RD regression with covariates.
The pattern of results in Table 3 is consistent with the theoretical models discussed in 
Section 3, which predict a decline in formal employment after the introduction of a social 
assistance program like AFAM. This decline could be due to the income effect generated 
by the monetary benefit, or to the transition from formal to informal employment induced 
by the implicit taxation on registered earnings introduced by the program’s income test. In 
Section 8 below, we use additional evidence from the follow-up survey to distinguish between 
these two channels.
We can also exploit the longitudinal nature of the social security administration records 
to study the effect of AFAM eligibility on the evolution of registered employment over time 
before and after application. To do so, we estimate the quadratic polynomial RD model with
25 The standard  set of covariates in the regressions are those listed in Table 1, and include gender, head of the household status, age, m arital status, educational level (in 3 categories), the number of children aged 0-17 in the household, whether the household was enrolled in the PANES program, residence in Montevideo (Uruguay’s capital), and whether the individual was a registered employee in the pre-application period.
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covariates separately for each semester before and after application to the program. Figure 
3 plots the evolution of these estimates over time, with the baseline period given by each 
household’s application date. The gray area represents the 90 percent confidence intervals. 
Again, consistent with the previous evidence of quasi-random assignment to the program 
in the neighborhood of the eligibility cutoff, there are no statistically significant differences 
between the eligible and the ineligible in the probability to engage in registered employment 
in the period before the application. This difference starts to increase (in absolute value) 
after the period of application, and it becomes sizable and statistically significant at the 90 
percent level three semesters after application. The difference between the two groups (as 
captured by the RD estimates) remains negative and statistically significant throughout the 
remainder of the time-horizon of our estimates (up to the 9th semester after application). 
This effect reaches a maximum four and a half years after application, with a negative effect 
of almost 9 percentage points. This persistent negative effect on registered employment 
may be due to the effects of long-term participation in social assistance programs, which 
might erode beneficiaries’ human capital and cause a loss of skills relevant for the labor 
market. Other factors mentioned in the literature on welfare dependency include a stigma 
from participation and the fact that participation might be interpreted as a bad signal by 
employers (Moffitt, 1992).
6.2 R ob u stn ess A nalysis
This section presents a series of specification checks of our RD design to show the robustness 
of our main results.
A first check refers to the timing of application and entry to the program. As illustrated 
in Figure A.1, application to AFAM occurred at different points in time during our period of 
analysis. The potentially non-random timing in applications might be related to potential 
outcomes.
In Appendix Table A.1, we study which household and individual characteristics from the 
baseline application records are related to the date of application.26 This evidence indicates 
that individuals with a higher eligibility score, who are older, more educated, not married and 
employed before the application process are those who applied earlier to AFAM. Moreover, 
consistent with the implementation of the program, individuals who were beneficiaries of 
the previous PANES transfer program also applied to AFAM earlier in the process. While 
we find some statistically significant correlations between individual characteristics and the 
timing of application to AFAM, the effects are quantitatively unimportant and most of the 
variation remains unexplained. This result is consistent with the evidence that most of the
26 The dependent variable in this regression analysis is the m onth and year of household application date expressed as an index equal to one in January 2008.
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applicants’ observable characteristics are continuous around the eligibility cutoff, although 
we cannot rule out discontinuous changes in unobservable characteristics given by the timing 
of application.
To establish whether this type of potential confounding factors affect our results, and 
to control for the upward trend in employment during the period we study, we estimate 
a difference-in-difference specification (RD-DD) of the RD model presented in equation 2. 
This model basically compares the discontinuity in post-application outcomes to discontinu­
ity in pre-application outcomes for individuals close to the threshold.27 The identification 
assumption of the RD-DD model is that any systematic differences between individuals who 
apply to AFAM at different points in time -  or any other unobservable factor that system- 
atically varies across applicants -  are time-invariant close to the threshold. Appendix Table 
A.10 presents the results of this analysis for a set of different bandwidths of the eligibility 
score. The size of the estimates is, in general, lower by about 20 percent, but the results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained from the standard RD model. This remains true even 
when we control for month fixed effects in the RD-DD specification.
We also conduct a number of additional robustness checks of the baseline RD specifi­
cation. First, Appendix Table A.7 examines the robustness of the registered employment 
estimates based on alternative bandwidths around the eligibility score cutoff (±0.02, ±0.05, 
±0.15, ±0.2 and ±0.073 -  the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth), on alternative 
RD polynomial specifications (linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic, estimated separately on 
either side of the threshold), and with and without controlling for covariates and individual 
fixed effects. The coefficients in Appendix Table A.7 are similar in both magnitude and 
statistical significance to most of those presented in Table 3. Moreover, in Appendix Table 
A.8 we present further estimates based on local linear regressions instead of polynomials. 
The results are qualitatively similar results to those obtained with our preferred specifica­
tion, a quadratic polynomial. Finally, a large fraction of individuals in our sample (about 
45 percent) belong to households with other adults in our sample. The results in Appendix 
Table A.9 indicate that our main results are robust to clustering the standard errors at 
the household level (rows 2 and 4) instead of at the individual level (rows 1 and 3, main 
results for comparison proposes) -  i.e., our results remain statistically significant even after 
accounting for the potential correlations within households.
27The RD-DD specification is similar to the standard  RD in equation 2, bu t it also includes information from the pre-application period. In the regression, we add interactions of a post-application (Post) indicator with each variable. Specifically, the RD-DD th a t we estim ate is given by the following equation:Yi =  «o +  l30E L E G i x P o sti +  50E L E G i x f  (scorei ) x P o sti +  K0f  (scorei ) x P o sti +Pl E L E G i +  6l E L E G i x f(sco re i ) +  K \f(score i ) +  Y \P o sti +
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6.3 H eterogen eou s E ffects by Socio-E conom ic G roups
The previous analysis considered average effects among all adult applicants. In the spirit of 
establishing an anatomy of responses to the AFAM program, we now examine the degree 
of heterogeneity of responses by subgroups of individuals defined by their baseline socio- 
economic and demographic characteristics. Table 4 reports the RD regression results for the 
different subgroups from the main sample (Appendix Tables A.18 through A.22 present the 
corresponding results for alternative bandwidth ranges).
The estimates in Table 4 are very informative of the pattern of responses. The effects are 
clearly stronger for household heads than for other members of the household (-8.9 compared 
to -4.5 percentage points), and not statistically significant in our baseline specification for 
the latter (most of the results in the Table are similar with the linear RD polynomial). 
They are also stronger for adults in mono-parental households (-9.8 p.p.) compared to the 
effects for adults in households with two parents (-5.4 p.p.). Moreover, the effects are much 
stronger for women (-10.8 percentage points, significant at the 1 percent level) than for men 
(-1.1 p.p., not significant), and for female heads (-12 p.p.) than for male heads (6.6 p.p., 
not significant). They are also stronger for adults below 30 (-12.6 p.p.) compared to effects 
for those aged 30 or more (-6.9 p.p.), and for the more educated (-8.4 p.p.) compared to 
those with lower education levels (-6.1 p.p.) -  these effects are statistically significant at 
standard levels for the four groups. These results indicate that those who responded the 
most to the program’s financial incentives were women and those with a higher need to 
work (household heads, adults in mono-parental households), but also younger and more 
educated applicants, who were probably closer to the margin of choice between registered 
and unregistered employment. We study this issue in more detail in the following sections.
6.4 G eneralizing th e  B aseline R esu lts
Thus far, the results presented have been based on comparing individuals relatively better off 
among the poor (those around the eligibility threshold) according to their eligibility score. In 
this section we explore whether or not the baseline RD estimates can be generalized to a larger 
population of eligible individuals, in particular to individuals in more severe conditions of 
poverty. To do this, we expand the bandwidth to the right of the AFAM eligibility threshold 
-  i.e., we include individuals from poorer households (those with higher eligibility scores). 
As derived from Lee and Lemieux (2010), by extending the bandwidth our RD estimate 
assigns weight to the effect of AFAM program also for eligible individuals away from the 
vicinity of the threshold. Figure 4 reports estimates from RD specifications that increase 
the bandwidth to the right of eligibility threshold by one quarter of a percentage point. The 
minimum bandwidth to the right of the cutoff point is 0.10 (baseline) and the maximum 
bandwidth is 0.60 -  i.e., the first point in the figure corresponds to a regression with a
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bandwidth of [-0.1; +0.1] while the last point corresponds to a bandwidth of [-0.1; +0.6]. 
This exercise is similar in spirit to that of Kostol and Mogstad (2014), who find that the 
effect of disability insurance on labor force participation declines as the RD bandwidth in 
the analysis is widened, although the estimates are always sizable. In particular, our RD 
estimates decline somewhat with the size of the window, but remains sizable even with a 
bandwidth of [-0.1;+0.6]. Also as in Kostol and Mogstad (2014), both the standard RD 
and the away-window-based RD results complement each other: our baseline RD results are 
informative of the effects of AFAM on registered employment if the program were expanded 
to less poor populations, whereas the RD estimates with wider bandwidth refer to the impact 
on the formal employment behavior of more severely impoverished eligible individuals.
7 D istrib u tion al Effects: P ro p en sity  to  W ork Form ally
Economic theory predicts differential effects among individuals with different propensities 
to work as formal employees -  i.e., those closer or further away from the registered/not 
registered employment margin of choice. We continue the anatomy of responses to the 
program by studying the effects of AFAM along this dimension.
The first step in this analysis is to estimate the propensity to work formally (in the 
absence of AFAM) as a function of baseline characteristics for all the individuals in our 
sample. We estimate a regression model with registered employment as a function of our 
standard set of covariates for the group of ineligible individuals only (Appendix Table A.11 
reports the coefficient estimates for this auxiliary regression). We then use the estimated 
coefficients to generate predicted values of the probability to work as a registered employee 
for all individuals in the sample (i.e., including also those deemed eligible). We then divide 
our samples into three roughly equally-sized groups based on their predicted propensity to 
work as a registered employee. Finally, we estimate the effects of the program with our 
baseline RD model for each of the three subgroups separately.28
Table 5 reports the RD estimates for these three groups (Appendix Tables A.12 through 
A.16 present the corresponding results for alternative bandwidth ranges). Column (3) 
presents the average of the dependent variable, registered employment, for the control group 
(ineligible individuals). Consistent with the exercise described in the previous paragraph, 
individuals in the bottom group of propensity to work formally, registered employment is 
low at 0.22 (panel A), compared to 0.41 for the middle group (panel B) and 0.81 for the high 
propensity group (panel C).
The effects of the program on registered employment are presented in Column (1) of 
Table 5. The effect is low (-3.7 p.p., panel A) and not statistically significant for the group
28Our estim ates remain virtually unchanged when we implement the leave-one-out bias correction m ethod for group stratification proposed in Abadie and Chingos (2014).
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with a low propensity to work formally. It is higher and statistically significant for the group 
with a high propensity to work formally (-5 p.p., panel C), although still below the effect 
for the full sample. The highest effect of the program is among the group with a middle 
propensity to work formally: -9.3 p.p., significant at the 1 percent level.
These results are consistent with some form of segmentation among potential beneficiaries 
of the program. Those with a low probability to work formally do not respond much to 
the financial incentives of the program because they have limited opportunities to work as 
registered employees to begin with. The opposite is true for those with a high propensity to 
work formally: they are not affected by the program’s disincentive for registered employment 
because most of them will work formally anyway. The group with the middle propensity to 
be formally employed seems to be the one closer to the margin of choice between formal and 
informal employment, and thus individuals in this group are those who react the most to 
the new incentives.
8 D ecom p osin g  th e  E ffects o f th e  Program : Inform al­
ity  and N on-E m ploym ent
The main analysis in the previous section was based on registered work histories as recorded 
in the administrative social security records. As discussed above, this high-quality data 
source has a limitation in terms of the outcomes of interest: while we can establish the 
effects of the program on changes in registered employment, we cannot separate the responses 
in terms of inactivity or non-registered employment -  i.e., we cannot know whether the 
null registered employment status represents a period in which the individual is out of 
employment or, alternatively, a period of informal employment. This is a fundamental 
distinction for public policy and is also relevant to an evaluation of the impact of the program 
on participants’ welfare. Our follow-up survey provides information to complement our 
benchmark specifications for registered employment. As it turns out, the information in the 
survey allows us to complete the anatomy of responses to the AFAM financial incentives by 
establishing the comparative magnitude of responses along these two margins.
We base our analysis on the subsample of eligible and ineligible applicants interviewed 
for the follow-up survey. Table 6 presents the baseline RD estimates of the program for this 
sample on the three mutually exclusive labor market outcomes: registered employment, non- 
employment and unregistered or informal employment. The overall effect for the follow-up 
survey sample on registered employment is -13.7 percentage points, larger in absolute value 
than our baseline RD results based on the full administrative records sample.29 In any case,
29 This difference in levels can be a ttribu ted  to the fact th a t we the follow-up survey covered only a sub-sample of the main sample, and only for a specific period of time and not for the full period under study.
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we still find a large (about 25 percent with respect to the employment level for the ineligible) 
and statistically significant reduction in registered employment.
The most valuable information in Table 6 is given by the following two rows: the 13.7 
p.p. reduction in registered employment was given by an increase in non-employment among 
the eligible of 4.6 p.p., and an increase in informal employment of 9.1 p.p. -  while the two 
coefficients are not statistically significant, we can reject the null that they are both jointly 
equal to zero (p-value of 0.052).
In the discussion of the predicted effects of the program, we posited that the trans­
fer could cause an increase in non-employment due to an income effect or a shift towards 
informal employment induced by the characteristics of the means test, which is based on 
administrative information about registered employment earnings. We find evidence of the 
two types of effects. To sum up, these results indicate that the observed reduction in regis­
tered employment induced by the program can be attributed to a larger extent (about two 
thirds) to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent (about one third) 
to a shift towards non-employment.
9 E lastic ity  o f P artic ip ation  and Efficiency E ffects
9.1 T he E lastic ity  o f P artic ip ation  in R eg istered  E m ploym ent
The results presented so far indicate that individuals eligible for AFAM responded to the 
program’s financial incentives schedule by reducing their participation in registered employ­
ment (Table 3). The average absolute response in terms of formal employment rates was 
relatively large -  about 8 percentage points, or about 15 percent with respect to the 51.8 
percent participation for the control group. In this section, we establish the magnitude of 
these responses in relation to the size of the program’s financial incentives. We use these 
results to establish a more general parameter, the aggregate elasticity of participation in 
formal employment to net of registered employment participation tax rate -  that is, the per- 
centage change in formal employment for each percentage point change in the net average 
tax rate.30 This elasticity is the main behavioral parameter that captures the sensitivity of 
responses to tax and transfers policies along the extensive margin (Eissa et al., 2006, 2008), 
and a key input to compute the efficiency effects of the program.
Eissa et al. (2006) derive the participation elasticity in a context of labor force partici­
pation responses to tax and benefits. Waseem (2015) extends this setup to a context where 
formal employment is the relevant extensive margin of response. As in Waseem (2015), we
30As discussed in Section 3, the income testing in the AFAM eligibility rule introduces a discrete change in the budget set. In contexts of tax-transfer schedules such as these, the participation tax  rate is generally considered more relevant to behavioral participation responses than  the marginal tax  rates (e.g., Eissa et. al., 2006).
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incorpórate the decisión to be a registered employee to the basic model of labor supply by 
assuming that formal employment provides a discrete utility cost ql to individuals. This 
utility cost include direct costs associated to formal employment (e.g. regulations, trans- 
portation costs to large urban areas where formal firms tends to agglomerate, etc). but also 
indirect costs, such as other social benefits that the worker would have to disregard as a 
registered employee (Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012). The utility maximization process 
is described in two stages. First, an agent chooses her optimal hours (or earnings) condi- 
tional on participation in registered employment. Second, the agent must decide whether 
to participate or not. Let w represent earnings from registered employment, let the func- 
tion T(w) be the tax and transfer schedule, and let -T (0) represent the program’s benefit 
(e.g., the AFAM cash transfer) which for simplicity we assume is received only by those who 
are not formally employed. An individual participates in formal employment if and only if 
the utility of doing so, U (w — T(w)) — ql , exceeds the utility from non-participation, which 
we assume to be u0 ( - T (0)) .31 This leads to the following condition for participation in 
registered employment:
This expression defines an upper bound q  on the discrete utility gain from participation 
in registered employmen. The size of q  reflects the utility gain from participating in reg­
istered employment accounting for taxes and transfers. That is, individuals with fixed cost 
q  below q  decide to participate in labor market as formal employees. If ql is distributed 
in the population according to a smooth function R(q), the fraction of individuals in regis­
tered employment is given by R(q). The elasticity of participation in registered employment 
captures movements into and out of formal employment as a consequence of the tax and 
transfer schedule:
This elasticity is defined as the percentage change in participation in registered employ­
ment, R(q), induced by a one percentage point change in the average net of participation 
in registered employment tax rate, 1 — p tr .32. It should be noted that the ptr corresponds 
to the effective average tax rate, which includes the loss of the program’s benefit following 
entry into registered employment (when the resulting earnings exceed the program’s income 
testing threshold).
We compute the aggregate elasticity of participation in registered employment, t R, in 
the context of our RD analysis by closely following the procedure developed by Kostol and
31This fixed cost is only incurred if the individual participates in registered employment. For simplicity, we assume that it is additively separable in utility.32For small changes in taxes and transfers, A(1 -  ptr) = d(1 -  ptr) and AR(q) = dR(q), so that the elasticity is given by eR = • R - R
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(3)
(4)
Mogstad (2014) in their analysis of the effects of disability insurance on labor supply in 
Norway. In particular, we define AR(q) as the difference in registered employment between 
eligible and ineligible individuals, whereas R(q) is given by the rate of registered employment 
for the ineligible. Since we do not have information on earnings in our data, we must make 
some assumptions regarding the definition and the computation of the participation tax rate 
ptr, a key input to find the elasticity t R. We compute earnings from Uruguay’s National 
Household Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares) for the period 2008-2012. Based on 
a sample of registered workers with household income below the poverty line, we regress 
registered earnings on a set of standard covariates.33 We use the estimated coefficients to 
predict registered employment earnings for all the individuals in our AFAM database. Based 
on these imputed incomes and on Uruguay’s tax and transfer schedule, we compute the net 
of ptr for every individual in our data.34 In Appendix Sections A.1 and A.2, we describe in 
more detail the procedure for computing t R and imputing earnings.
Table 7 presents the elasticities that result from this exercise. Each column presents the 
estimates of the components of equation (4) and the resulting elasticity, with column (1) 
presenting results for the overall sample, and columns (2), (3) and (4) presenting the esti­
mates for the subsamples of individuals with low, medium and high probabilities of working 
as registered employees, as in the discussion of Tables 3 and 5. The difference in registered 
employment (first row), our proxy for AR(q), is 7.8 percentage points for the overall sam­
ple, and -3.4, -9.4 and -5.5 p.p. for those with low, medium and high propensities to work 
formally, respectively. The average registered employment level for ineligible individuals 
(second row), our proxy for R(q), is 51.5 percent, and consistent with the classification of in­
dividuals in the three categories, it was 22.5 percent, 40.9 percent and 80.8 percent for those 
with low, medium and high propensities to work as registered employees, respectively.35 The 
average change in the net-of ptr (third row), given by the loss of the entire AFAM cash 
transfer at the income eligibility threshold, is 7.1 percent points -  the implied tax rate over 
the benefit is 100 percent at the threshold, but we average over the whole distribution to
33We use the standard covariates listed in the notes to Table 3, with the exception of the variables for enrollment in the PANES program  and employment a t baseline, which are not available in the household survey.34The tax  and transfer schedule for low income registered workers in Uruguay is fairly simple -  their earnings are only subject to a payroll tax  (social security contributions) am ounting to 21 percent of gross earnings, paid by the employer, and they are eligible for the AFAM benefit if they meet the program ’s eligibility criteria. The income tax  minimum threshold is well above the earnings of low income workers. Employers are liable for payroll tax  on earnings in the form of social security contributions of up to 13 percent of gross earnings. We implicitly assume th a t workers and employers each pay the sta tu to ry  rate assigned by the tax  authorities. If registered employees bear the full incidence of the sum of employee and employer payroll taxes, the effective tax  ra te  would be higher than  w hat we use in our com putation.35 There are some small differences between the point estim ates reported in the first and second rows of Table 7 and those in Tables 3 and 5. This is due to the fact th a t we were unable to im pute registered labor income for about 5 percent of the sample due to missing information for covariates in the adm inistrative records. The differences are small and do not alter the conclusions drawn from these results.
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obtain the change in the average tax rate. Finally, the participation tax rate (fourth row) is 
about 79 percent, consistent with the 21 percent payroll tax rate, the only tax levied on the 
registered employment earnings of these low-income workers.
The bottom row of Table 7 presents our estimates for the registered employment elasticity 
implied by the taxes and benefits for the relevant population. Our results indicate an average 
elasticity of participation in registered employment with respect to the net-of-participation 
in registered employment tax rate of 1.689, i.e., a reduction of 1 percent in this rate (the 
net-of-tax share of income that individuals can keep) reduces registered employment by 1.7 
percent. Consistent with the estimated effects of the program for the different subgroups, 
the elasticity is substantially higher (about 2.6) for those with a medium propensity to work 
as a registered employee, compared to an elasticity of 1.67 for those with a low propensity 
to work formally and an elasticity of 0.76 for those in the group with a high propensity to 
work formally. These results reflect the fact that the middle group is the most responsive to 
changes in the tax and transfer schedule.
Our results for Uruguay indicate that individuals in developing countries react in their 
labor market entry decisions to the incentives implied by the tax and transfer schedule they 
face, although they react along the formal/informal employment margin of labor supply 
since taxes apply to (and transfers depend on) earnings from registered employment only. 
Moreover, even based on very different populations, and very different tax and transfer 
systems and reforms, our estimate of the average participation elasticity is within the range 
(although close to the higher bound) of previous results in the literature for developed 
countries. For instance, Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner’s (2006) review of empirical studies 
concludes that the extensive margin responses to tax reforms for single mothers “correspond 
to participation elasticities in the range from 0.35 to 1.7”. Bargain and Doorley (2011) 
summarize the empirical evidence for France, stating that the participation elasticities for 
married women in families with children is close to 1. However, the elasticity estimates for 
developed countries capture the change in labor supply, whereas our estimate reflects the 
response in terms of non-participation but also in terms of movements between formal and 
informal employment. The results in Section 8 indicate that the program reduced registered 
employment, with the informality margin accounting for two thirds and the non-employment 
margin accounting for one third of the response. Using these results, a back of the envelope 
calculation results in a participation elasticity of about 0.56, more in line with the literature 
on developed countries, with about 1.14 for the formal-informal margin of adjustment.
9.2 W elfare and Efficiency Im plications o f th e  A FA M  Program
The empirical analysis performed thus far has shown that AFAM created incentives to reduce 
participation in registered employment. With the elasticity computed in the previous section,
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where D B  is the deadweight burden, w is the wage, P  is the probability of being employed, 
ptr is the participation tax rate, tR is the elasticity of participation in registered employment, 
and 9 is an abstract parameter used to derive the effects of the policy. The deadweight loss 
is directly related to the relevant elasticity in the context of AFAM, and the welfare cost is 
a function of the tax rate at the extensive (participation) margin of labor supply, ptr. This 
includes (as in Eissa et al., 2006) the loss of the cash transfer from participation in registered 
employment and the payroll tax. The change in ptr is basically associated to the loss of the 
AFAM benefit at the eligibility threshold (i.e. analogous to the elasticity calculation above).
We compute this deadweight loss as an average for a representative agent based on the 
elasticity and the tax rate from the previous section. Specifically, the deadweight loss from 
the behavioral response at the extensive margin of labor supply is the result of multiplying 
the average tax ratio, the average tax rate change, and the participation elasticity from Table 
7. The results are presented in Table 8. We find that the behavioral responses to AFAM 
imply a deadweight loss (or efficiency cost) of about 3.2 percent of total labor income. 
As a benchmark, Eissa, Kleven, and Claus Kreiner (2006) find that the welfare gains from 
extensive margin changes induced by the Earned Income Tax Credit and the 1986 tax reform 
in the United States range from 3.27 percent to 7.64 percent of wage income. The efficiency 
cost from AFAM for the representative agent thus seem significant but not exceedingly large. 
However, this discussion does not take into account other plausible negative implications of 
not participating in the formal labor market over the long term. “Inactivity traps” have
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we can establish the size of the deadweight loss given by the loss in tax revenue from the 
reduction in registered employment induced by this policy.
As discussed above, Eissa, Kleven, and Claus Kreiner (2006, 2008) model the discrete 
labor market entry and exit decisions given by non-convexities in preferences and budget sets, 
and they incorporate these results into the standard framework for the efficiency evaluation of 
tax reforms. In the context of AFAM, the non-convexities are substantial, and this framework 
allows us to capture the first-order welfare effects of behavioral responses along the extensive 
(participation) margin of labor supply. More specifically, Eissa et al. (2006) show that the 
marginal deadweight burden of a tax reform is given by the effect of behavioral responses 
on government revenue. In their setup, the impact on revenue from the behavioral response 
is given by reactions at both the intensive margin (change in hours of work for those who 
are working) and the extensive margin of labor supply brought about by the tax-induced 
change in labor force participation. We concentrate on the latter because we do not have 
information on hours worked in our data.
We adapt Eissa, Kleven and Kreine’s (2006) formula for the marginal deadweight burden 
as a proportion of total labor income as:
detrimental effects, for instance the depreciation of human capital over time. Informal jobs, 
on the other hand, imply higher risks (since they do not provide access to social insurance), 
and are associated with worse working conditions, lower job stability and flatter earnings 
profiles over time.
10 C onclusion
The AFAM program’s eligibility rules, based on verification of reported earnings, create a 
strong disincentive for registered employment -  a notch in beneficiaries budget constraints. 
Individuals in households that applied to the program reacted as predicted by economic 
theory. We built an anatomy of the labor market responses induced by the program’s 
financial incentives along four dimensions. First, we established that beneficiaries responded 
to the program’s incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 
percentage points. Second, we found substantial heterogeneity in these effects: the program 
had a stronger negative effect for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered 
employee, suggesting some form of segmentation in which those with a low probability to 
work formally did not respond much to the financial incentives of the program, probably 
because they had limited opportunities to work as registered employees to start with. Third, 
by matching administrative data with a follow-up survey, we established that the fall in 
registered employment was due to a greater extent (about two thirds) to an increase in 
unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent (about one third) to a shift towards non- 
employment. Fourth, we found an elasticity of participation in registered employment of 
about 1.7. The program lead to a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses of about 
3.2 percent of total labor income. The efficiency cost from AFAM for the representative 
agent is significant but not exceedingly large, although there might be other detrimental 
effects from lowered participation in formal employment.
Our results allow us to draw valuable lessons that can be used to minimize programs’ 
disincentives and efficiency costs. When designing programs of this type, policy makers in 
developing countries must consider reactions along the registered/unregistered employment 
margin, and find ways to mitigate these unintended adverse results. A first implication of our 
analysis is that AFAM authorities (and those designing similar initiatives in countries with 
widespread informal employment) could consider some way to smooth out the cash notch 
implied by the program’s eligibility rule. For instance, the income test could be modified by 
introducing a more continuous schedule with phase in and phase out regions that withdraw 
the benefit gradually and with lower implicit tax rates, rather than generating a total loss 
of the benefit at the income threshold. Alternatively, the authorities could test the effects 
of allowing beneficiaries to continue in the program while having earnings from registered 
employment above the threshold for a transitory period. This temporary earnings disregard
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could ease the transition to formal employment, and mitigate the possibility that beneficiaries 
might prefer lower but more stable income from the program rather than higher but riskier 
earnings from registered employment.
The fact that there was significant heterogeneity among responses to the program as a 
function of individuals’ propensities to engage in formal employment also has direct conse- 
quences for the design of programs of this type, and particularly for their incentive structures. 
For instance, specific incentives or conditionalities that are costly to monitor (such as mini- 
mum working hours requirements) may only be worthwhile for those who might be expected 
to react to the program’s incentives. The poorest beneficiaries (as proxied by a low propen­
sity to be a formal employee) seem to be infra-marginal in terms of the formal/informal work 
decision, and thus concerns about disincentives to registered employment are less relevant for 
this group. They could benefit more form other policy initiatives, such as direct job creation 
(Knoef and Ours, 2016). At the same time, the high responsiveness among the less poor ben­
eficiaries suggests that the program could incorporate differential incentives for this group. 
Just as work incentives guided welfare reforms in developed countries, the new generation 
of cash transfer and social assistance programs in developing countries could incorporate 
measures to reduce the disincentives to formal employment. For instance, programs such as 
AFAM could encourage registered employment drawing from the design of programs such as 
the United States’ Earned Income Tax Credit -  for certain groups, the programs could pay 
a higher level of benefit to beneficiaries who switch to registered employment.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Comparison of Samples: Applicants to AFAM, Main and Follow-Up Samples
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lica tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h istories for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . T h e  “P o p u la tio n ” in  co lum n (1) refers to  ind iv idu a ls  in  th ese  age categories in  all households app ly in g  to  AFAM  d uring  th e  period  u n d er s tu d y  — i.e., th e  th e  en tire  p o p u la tio n  of AFAM  ap p lican ts . T h e  “M ain  S am p le” in  co lum n (2) refers to  th e  sub se t of ind iv idu a ls  from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [ -0 .1 ; +0.1] o f th e  elig ib ility  score — i.e., ind iv idu a ls  close to  th e  eligibility  score th re sh o ld  w hich we use for ou r m ain  resu lts. T h e  “Follow-Up S am p le” in  co lum n (3) co rresponds to  th e  sub se t o f in d iv iduals in terv iew ed  for th e  p ro g ram ’s follow-up survey  d urin g  th e  period  S ep tem ber 201-F ebruary  2013, d raw n  from  households w ith in  a  range of [—0.0426;+ 0.0727] o f th e  elig ib ility  score (see S ection  4.3 for m ore d e ta ils). A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  p resen ted  in  th is  ta b le  are  m easured  a t  th e  d a te  of ap p lica tio n , i.e. before th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  decision  o n  en ro llm en t to  th e  p ro gram .
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Table 2: Mean and Regression Discontinuity Differences in Baseline Characteristics, Eligible and Ineligible Individuals, Main Sample
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym en t d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specification  described  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  respective ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . T h e  coefficient’s s ta n d a rd  erro rs in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  3: Effect of A FA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t, R D  E s tim a te s
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . P anels  A an d  B p resen t th e  regression  es tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith o u t covariates an d  w ith  covariates, respectively. T h e  regressions are  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  co lum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easu red  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym en t for th e  ind iv idua l in  a  given ca len d ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  first row  in  each  of th e  P anels  p resen ts  resu lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym en t d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . T h e  covariates in  th e  regressions in  P an el B include gender, h ead  of th e  household  s ta tu s , age, m arita l s ta tu s , ed u ca tio n al level (in  3 categories), th e  n um b er o f ch ild ren  aged 0-17 in  th e  household , w h e th er th e  household  w as enrolled  in  th e  PA N E S p ro gram , residence in  M ontev ideo  (U ru g u ay ’s ca p ita l), an d  w heth er th e  in d iv idu a l was a  reg istered  em ployee. A ll covariates co rrespond  to  th e  d a te  w hen  th e  household  app lied  to  th e  p ro gram . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial e s tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le in d iv iduals ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  4: H eterogeneous Effects of A FA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub-G roups
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for u p  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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Table 5: Effect of AFAM Eligibility on Registered Employment by Propensity to be a Registered Employee
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro gram , as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le in d iv iduals ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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Table 6: Effect of AFAM Eligibility on Different Margins of Participation, Follow-Up Sample
N otes: T h e  resu lts  in  th is  ta b le  are  based  o n  th e  “Follow-Up S am p le ,” w hich includes heads o f households an d  spouses o f h eads of households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  o f th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h is  sam ple co rresponds to  th e  sub se t of ind iv idu a ls  w ho were in terv iew ed  for th e  p ro g ram ’s follow-up survey  d urin g  th e  p eriod  S ep tem ber 2011-F ebruary  2013. T h e  su rv ey ’s sam ple was d raw n  from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [-0 .04 26 ; +0.0727] of th e  elig ib ility  score (see S ection  4 .3 for m ore d e ta ils). T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  from  th e  p ro g ram ’s follow-up survey  d a ta  (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  no tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  th e  firs t row, th e  d ep en den t variab le  is th e  reg istered  em ploym ent s ta tu s  as re p o rted  by th e  in d iv idu a l a t  th e  tim e  of th e  in terv iew  (one if she is w orking as a  reg istered  em ployee, zero o therw ise). In  th e  second row, th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is non-em ploym ent, ag a in  as re p o rted  by th e  in d iv idu a l a t  th e  tim e  of th e  in terv iew , w hich is equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l is n o t w orking, an d  equal to  zero if she is w orking (as a  reg istered  o r as a  n on-reg istered  em ployee). In  th e  th ird  row, th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is in form al em ploym en t a t  th e  tim e  o f th e  in terv iew , w hich  is equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l is w orking as a n  in fo rm al (o r n on-reg istered ) em ployee, an d  zero o therw ise (i.e., w orking as a  reg istered  em ployee o r n o t w orking). E ach  of th ese  rows p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p rogram , as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro gram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  fo u rth  row  p resen ts  th e  p-value o f th e  te s t th a t  th e  coefficients for th e  “N on -E m p lo ym en t” an d  “Inform al E m p lo y m en t” regressions a re  jo in tly  equal to  zero. C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  on  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side of cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le in d iv iduals ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lu m n  1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er o f observations. H u b e r-W h ite  ro b u s t s ta n d a rd  erro rs show n in  paren theses, * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
46
T able  7: E las tic ity  o f P a r tic ip a tio n  in  R eg is te red  E m ploym en t
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . T h e  e lastic ity  fo rm ula is given in  E q u a tio n  (4) and  discussed in  S ection  9.1. See A pp end ix  A.1 for m ore d eta ils. “A verage” refers to  th e  es tim ate s  for th e  w hole sam ple. C olum ns (2), (3) an d  (4) co rrespond  to  e s tim ate s  for th e  sub grou p s of ind iv idu a ls  w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  d e ta iled  ex p lan a tio n  o f th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . “A R eg is tered  E m ploy m en t” rep resen ts  th e  differences in  reg istered  em ploym ent b etw een  eligible an d  ineligible ind iv idu a ls  as g iven by th e  q u a d ra tic  po lynom ial RD m odel w ith  covariates in  T ab le  3 (P ane l B, C olum n (1), first row) an d  T able 5 (C o lu m n  (1), first row ). “R eg istered  E m ploym en t (Ine lig ib le)” den o tes  th e  reg istered  em ploym ent ra te  for ineligible in d iv iduals ( th e  con tro l g roup). T h e  “N et-o f-P a rtic ip a tio n  T ax  R a te ” is given by  E q u a tio n  (3) in  A pp end ix  A .1, an d  it  is derived from  th e  co m b in ation  o f ta x e s  an d  tran sfe rs  (including  th e  AFAM  schedule) faced by  ind iv idu a ls  a t  th e  b o tto m  of th e  incom e d is tr ib u tio n  in  U ruguay. T h e  differences in  th is  ta x  b etw een  eligible an d  inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  a re  given by  E q u a tio n  (4) in  A ppend ix  A.1. T h e  “N et-o f-P a rtic ip a tio n  T ax  R a te  (Ine lig ib le)” is co m p uted  as th e  m ean  value for inelig ib le ind iv iduals.
Table 8: Efficiency Effects of AFAM
N o tes : T h e  re su lts  in  th is  T ab le  are  derived  from  th o se  in  T ab le  7. See th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  7 an d  th e  d iscussion  in  S ections 9.1, 9.2 an d  A ppend ix  A.1 for m ore deta ils.
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F ig ure  1: T h e  A FA M  In tak e  P rocess: P a r tic ip a tio n  R a te s  a n d  E lig ib ility  Score
N otes: T h is  figure p lo ts  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  AFAM  ag a in s t th e  elig ib ility  score for th e  sam ple o f households w ith  h eads an d  spouses of h eads aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro gram , from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [-0 .2 ; +0.2] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010). T h e  eligibility  score is s tan d a rd iz ed  so th a t  th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld  is zero, w ith  positive scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  eligible households an d  negative scores in d ica tin g  ineligible households. E ach  p o in t (b lue circle) in  th e  p lo t rep resen ts  th e  p ercen tage  o f in d iv iduals in  ap p lic an t households th a t  p a rtic ip a te d  in  AFAM  in  elig ib ility  score b ins of one p ercen tage  p o in t. T h e  red  solid line p lo ts  p red ic ted  values from  a  second degree po lynom ial m odel es tim ated  a t each  side o f th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . “C oef"  re p o rts  th e  e s tim a te d  coefficient (and  its  co rresponding  s ta n d a rd  e rro r in  paren thesis) from  a  q u a d ra tic  polynom ial R D  regression  w ith o u t ad d itio n a l covariates.
48
F ig ure  2: R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t R a te s  by  E lig ib ility  Score, P re  an d  P o st A p p lica tio n
a) Pre-Application period
b) Post-Application period
Notes: This figure plots registered employment against the eligibility score. The sample corresponds to heads of households and spouses of heads of households aged 18 to 57 at the time of application to AFAM during the period January 2008 to September 2010, from households within a range of [—0.1;+0.1] of the eligibility score. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010) matched with the registered employment work histories for the period January 2005 to December 2012 from the Social Security Administration’s administrative records (see Section 4.4 for a detailed description of the data). The eligibility score is standardized so that the eligibility threshold is zero, with positive scores indicating individuals in eligible households and negative scores indicating individuals in ineligible households. Each point (blue circle) in the plot represents the average value of the outcome variable in eligibility score bins of one half of a percentage point. The red solid line plots predicted values from a second degree polynomial model estimated at each side of the eligibility threshold. “Coef" reports the estimated coefficient (and its corresponding standard error in parenthesis) from a quadratic polynomial RD regression without additional covariates.
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F ig ure  3: Effect of AFA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t O ver T im e. E s tim a te s  by  S em ester
Notes: The sample corresponds to heads of households and spouses of heads of households aged 18 to 57 at the time of application to AFAM during the period January 2008 to September 2010, from households within a range of [—0.1;+0.1] of the eligibility score. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010) matched with the registered employment work histories for the period January 2005 to December 2012 from the Social Security Administration’s administrative records (see Section 4.4 for a detailed description of the data). Each point (blue circle) in the plot represents the estimate of the effect of eligibility on registered employment for a specific semester from one to three semesters before application to AFAM, and up to 9 semesters after applying to the program. All regressions include covariates as controls (see notes to Table 3). The estimates correspond to the quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the eligibility cutoff. The gray band plots 90% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the individual level.
Figure 4: RD Estimates of AFAM Eligibility on Registered Employment for Different Bandwidths
Notes: This figure plots the effect of AFAM eligibility on registered employment for different bandwidths. The sample corresponds to heads of households and spouses of heads of households aged 18 to 57 at the time of application to AFAM during the period January 2008 to September 2010, from households within different ranges of the eligibility score. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010) matched with the registered employment work histories for the period January 2005 to December 2012 from the Social Security Administration’s administrative records (see Section 4.4 for a detailed description of the data). Each point represents the results from a different RD specification, in which we increase the bandwidth to the right of the eligibility threshold by one quarter of a percentage point — i.e., the first point in the figure corresponds to a regression with a bandwidth of [—0.1;+0.1] while the last point corresponds to a bandwidth of [—0.1;+0.6]. All regressions include covariates as controls (see notes to Table 3). The estimates correspond to the quadratic RD polynomial, estimated separately on either side of the eligibility cutoff. The gray band plots 90% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the individual level.
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The Anatomy of Behavioral Responses to Social Assistance when Informal Employment is High
Marcelo Bergolo and Guillermo Cruces 
August 2016
i
A .1 C om p u tation  o f th e  E lastic ity  o f P artic ip ation  in R eg- 
istered  E m ploym ent
As discussed in the main text, we compute the elasticity of participation in registered employment 
with respect to the participation tax rate (ptr) based on the Kostol and Mogstad (2014) framework. 
In Section 9 (main text), we defined this elasticity as:
By using this change of notation we can express tR in equation (A.1.1) as:
(A.1.2)
Our analysis covers both the entire sample and the three sub-samples of individuals grouped 
according to their propensity to work as a formal employee, as in Section 7. We obtain estimates of 
R ineligible as the average registered employment rate for ineligible individuals for the whole sample 
and for the three subgroups separately. Finally,AR corresponds to the estimates from the RD 
model with controls, with results presented in Tables 3 and 5.
Since we do not have information on earnings in our data, we must make some assumptions 
regarding the definition and the computation of the participation tax rate ptr, a key input to find 
the elasticity tR. We obtain earnings from an imputation based on Uruguay’s National Household 
Survey (Encuesta Continua de Hogares) for the period 2008-2012. Based on a sample of registered 
workers with household income below the poverty line, we regress registered earnings on a series 
of covariates listed in Table 3 (with the exception of variables for: previous enrollment in PANES 
program and being employed at baseline, due to those variables are unavailable in the Household 
Survey). As described in detail in the following section, we use the estimated coefficients to 
predict registered employment earnings yi (from work as wage earners and as self-employed) for 
all individuals in our AFAM database.
ii
(A .1 .1 )
W e o b ta in  th e  n e t  t r a n s f e r s  T (yi ) b a s e d  o n  U r u g u a y ’s t a x  lev els  a n d  th e  A F A M  tr a n s f e r  sc h e d u le  
a c c o rd in g  to  e a c h  in d iv id u a l  a n d  h e r  h o u s e h o ld  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  T h e  t a x  sc h e d u le  fo r  low  in c o m e  
r e g is te re d  w o rk e rs  in  U ru g u a y  is fa ir ly  s im p le  -  th e i r  e a rn in g s  a re  o n ly  s u b je c t  to  a  p a y ro ll t a x  
( in  fa c t ,  so c ia l s e c u r ity  c o n tr ib u tio n s )  a m o u n tin g  to  18.09 p e rc e n t  fo r v e ry  low  in c o m e s  a n d  21 .13  
p e rc e n t  fo r  th e  n e x t  r a n g e  o f g ro ss  e a rn in g s , p a id  b y  th e  e m p lo y e r .36 T h e  in c o m e  t a x  m in im u m  
th re s h o ld  is w ell a b o v e  th e  e a rn in g s  o f low  in c o m e  w o rk e rs , so w e a s su m e  t h a t  th e  t a r g e t  p o p u la t io n  
o f  A F A M  is n o t  l ia b le  fo r  p e r s o n a l  in c o m e  ta x e s . W e c o m p u te  th e  e x a c t  A F A M  b e n e f i t  fo r  e a c h  
in d iv id u a l  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  fo rm u la  g iv en  b y  e q u a t io n  (1) (m a in  t e x t  o f  th e  p a p e r ) .  W e o b ta in e d  
th e  in fo rm a tio n  r e q u i re d  to  c o m p u te  th e  e x a c t  b e n e f i t  f ro m  th e  p r o g r a m ’s a d m in is t r a t iv e  d a ta b a s e .  
T h e  e ffec tiv e  ptr a lso  a c c o u n ts  fo r  th e  lo ss o f  th e  A F A M  b e n e f i t  w h e n  e a rn in g s  f ro m  re g is te re d  
e a rn in g s  a re  a b o v e  th e  p r o g r a m ’s e lig ib il ity  th re s h o ld .
B a s e d  o n  th e s e  in p u ts  -  im p u te d  in c o m e s , ta x e s  a n d  t r a n s f e r s  -  w e c o m p u te  th e  ptr fo r  e v e ry  
in d iv id u a l  in  o u r  d a ta b a s e .  T h e  e ffec tiv e  ptr a t  a  g iv en  lev el o f  im p u te d  e a rn in g s  f ro m  re g is te re d  
e m p lo y m e n t yk is g iv en  b y  th e  d iffe ren ce  b e tw e e n  n e t  ta x e s  a n d  t r a n s f e r s  a t  t h a t  lev e l o f  in c o m e  
T (yk ) a n d  a t  z e ro  e a rn in g s  f ro m  r e g is te re d  e m p lo y m e n t, T (0 ). T h e  ptr as a  p r o p o r t io n  o f im p u te d  
e a rn in g s  is th u s :
(A .1 .3 )
W e th e n  de fin e  th e  d iffe ren ce  in  ptr as th e  w e ig h te d  d iffe ren ce  b e tw e e n  th e  ptr r a te s  fo r  e lig ib le  
a n d  in e lig ib le  in d iv id u a ls :
(A .1 .4 )
w h e re  w e d e fin e  k = 1 0  b in s  o f  e a rn in g s  f ro m  re g is te re d  e a rn in g s  yk b y  dk in c re m e n ts , a n d  w e 
c o m p u te  ptrk a t  th e  a v e ra g e  in c o m e  fo r e a c h  b in . E (P T R k\eligible) is th e  a v e ra g e  ptr fo r e lig ib le  
in d iv id u a ls  a n d  E (P T R k\ineligible) is th e  a v e ra g e  ptr fo r  in e lig ib le  in d iv id u a ls . T h e  w e ig h ts  pk 
re fle c t th e  d e n s i ty  o f  th e  in c o m e  d is t r ib u t io n  fu n c t io n  fo r th e  in e lig ib le  in d iv id u a ls , a n d  th e y  a re  
c o m p u te d  as:
T h is  im p lie s  t h a t  A p i r  is th e  w e ig h te d  su m  o f  th e  d iffe ren ces  b e tw e e n  r e g is te re d  e m p lo y m e n t 
p a r t i c ip a t io n  t a x  r a te s  fo r  e lig ib le  a n d  in e lig ib le  in d iv id u á is ,  w i th  w e ig h ts  g iv en  b y  th e  (c o n d itio n a l)  
d e n s i ty  o f  th e  r e g is te re d  e a rn in g s  o f  in e lig ib le  in d iv id u a ls  w h o  w o rk  as  r e g is te re d  em p lo y ees .
In  th e  c o n te x t  o f  o u r  a n a ly s is , th e  p a y ro ll  t a x  d o e s  n o t  v a ry  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  b e tw e e n  in d iv id u a ls , 
so th e  m a in  so u rc e  o f  v a r ia t io n  in  th e  in c e n tiv e s  to  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in  r e g is te re d  e m p lo y m e n t is
36Employers are liable for payroll tax on earnings in the form of social security contributions of up to 13 percent of gross earnings. We implicitly assume that workers and employers each pay the statutory rate assigned by the tax authorities. If registered employees bear the full incidence of the sum of employee and employer payroll taxes, the effective tax rate would be higher than what we use in our computation.
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(A .1 .5 )
the variation given by the gain/loss of the AFAM transfer above/below the program’s registered 
earnings eligibility threshold.
A .2 Im p u tation  o f Individual E arnings from  R egistered  
E m ploym ent
A key input to compute the participation tax rate is the level of earnings from registered employ­
ment at the individual level, which is not available in our data. We rely on a standard imputation 
procedure based on the data from the 2008-2012 Uruguay’s National Household Survey (Encuesta 
Continua de Hogares, henceforth ECH). The ECH is a nationally representative household survey 
conducted according to international standards. It combines elements of living standards and labor 
force surveys, and it is the main source for socioeconomic, labor and demographic indicators in 
Uruguay. The microdata and supporting documents, such as questionnaires and details on sam- 
ple selection and stratification, are all made available to the public by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas.37
The imputation procedure consists of a series of steps. First, based on the ECH microdata 
we estimate the likelihood that an individual participates in (and has earnings from) registered 
employment for the subsample of individuals under the poverty line -  i.e., the population targeted 
by the AFAM program -  in a baseline year. The imputation of earnings from registered employment 
is based on a simple earnings regression, specified as follows:
where RE í is earnings for individual i, and X  corresponds to a set of demographic and household 
characteristics, including age, head of the household indicator, marital status, education level (in 
three categories), the number children in the household under 18, an indicator for residency in 
the capital city (Montevideo), and an indicator for participation in AFAM. To account for the 
self-selection of workers in registered employment, we include a propensity score -  the predicted 
probability of participation in registered employment -  as an additional control in the earnings 
equation. We estimate this predicted probability from a probit model as follows:
iv
where PRE is participation in registered employment, and the variables Z include the same demo­
graphic controls as in X  in the earnings equation, plus an additional variable indicating whether the 
spouse of the individual is a registered employee, as in Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2012). Thus, 
we identify the selection effect based on the registered participation of the individual’s spouse.
The next step implies using the estimated coefficients of the earnings model for each year to
37 http ://w w w .ine.gub.uy
predict the earnings from registered employment among individuals in our AFAM database. We 
impute potential earnings from registered employment for individuals who are working and for 
those who are not. Finally, we use the predicted earnings to simulate the participation tax rates 
(with and without the AFAM program) as described in the previous section.
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A .3  A dditional R esults: Tables
A .3 .1  T im ing o f A p p lication  to  A FA M
Table A.1: Determinants of Household Application Date to AFAM
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  th e  en tire  p o p u la tio n  o f ap p lican t households w ith  a d u lts  aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lica tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010). T h e  d ep en d en t variab le  is d a te  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM  defined as th e  m o n th  and  year of household  ap p lic a tio n  d a te  expressed  as a n  index  equal to  one in  Ja n u a ry  2008. All in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  p resen ted  in  th is  ta b le  are  m easured  a t  th e  d a te  of ap p lica tio n , i.e. before th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  decision  o n  en ro llm en t to  th e  p ro gram . H u b er-W h ite  ro b u st s ta n d a rd  erro rs  in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
V i
A .3 .2  R ob u stn ess o f B alance C hecks
Table A.2: Baseline Characteristics R ange of [-0.02; 0.02] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N otes: T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 2 ; +0.02] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specifica tion  d escribed  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  resp ec tiv e ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . S ta n d ard  erro rs  in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.3: B aseline C h a rac te ris tic s  -  R ange of [-0.05; 0.05] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 5 ; +0.05] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specifica tion  d escribed  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  resp ec tiv e ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . S ta n d ard  erro rs  in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.4: B aseline C h a rac te ris tic s  -  R ange of [-0.15; 0.15] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .1 5 ; +0.15] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specifica tion  d escribed  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  resp ec tiv e ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . S ta n d ard  erro rs  in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.5: B aseline C h a rac te ris tic s  -  R ange of [-0.2; 0.2] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.2 ;+ 0 .2 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specifica tion  d escribed  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  resp ec tiv e ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . S ta n d ard  erro rs  in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.6: B aseline  C h a rac te ris tic s  -  R ange of [-0.073; 0.073] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score (O p tim a l
B an d w id th )
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  J a n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [-0 .07 3 ; +0.073] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  reco rds (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  included  in  th is  ta b le  co rrespo n d  to  th e  hou seho ld ’s ap p lic a tio n  d a te , w ith  th e  ex cep tio n  o f th e  la s t tw o rows in  th e  m ain  p anel. “R egistered  36 m o n ths p re ” refers to  each  in d iv id u a l’s average reg istered  em ploym en t ra te  for th e  36 m o n ths before ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM . “P red ic ted  Reg. Em ploy.” refers to  a  m easure o f p o s t-a p p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent p red ic ted  using  th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  1 an d  p re -ap p lica tio n  reg istered  em ploym ent d a ta . C olum ns (1) an d  (2) p resen t th e  average ch a rac te ris tic s  for in d iv iduals from  eligible an d  inelig ib le households, respectively. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  p-value o n  th e  difference in  m eans of each  row ’s ch a rac te ris tic  b etw een  in d iv iduals in  th e  tw o groups. C olum n  (4), in  tu rn , re p o rts  th e  coefficient o f th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  in d ica to r from  a  s ta n d a rd  R D  specifica tion  d escribed  in  E q u a tio n  (2), w ith  th e  resp ec tiv e ch a rac te ris tic  as th e  d ep en d en t variable . S ta n d ard  erro rs  in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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A .3 .3 R ob u stn ess o f th e  R egression  D iscon tin u ity  R esu lts
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T able  A.7: Effect o f A FA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t, A lte rn a tiv e  B an d w id th s  an d  P o lyn o m ial M odels
N otes: T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses o f h eads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  period  Jan u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  colum ns co rrespond  to  d ifferent specifications of th e  b a n d w id th  — th e  ranges o f th e  elig ib ility  score from  w hich th e  households were selected . T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym ent w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social Security  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . In  co lum ns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), an d  (11) th e  d ep en d e n t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym en t in  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod . In  co lum ns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), an d  (12) th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym en t in  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . R eg istered  em ploym ent, m easu red  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  a re  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca len d ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. A ll rows an d  colum ns re p o rt th e  coefficient o n  th e  AFAM  eligibility  in d ica to r, equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if scorei> 0), an d  zero  o therw ise. T h e  rows co rrespond  to  different specifications o f th e  R D  polynom ial, tim e  fixed effects, an d  con tro ls. W h en  corresponding , th e  covariates in  th e  regressions include gender, head o f th e  household  s ta tu s , age, m arita l s ta tu s , ed u ca tio n a l level (in  3 ca tegories), th e  n u m b er o f ch ild ren  aged 0-17 in  th e  household , w he th er th e  household  was enrolled  in  th e  PA N E S p ro gram , residence in  M ontev ideo  (U ru g u ay ’s ca p ita l), an d  w heth er th e  in d iv idu a l was a  reg istered  em ployee. A ll covariates co rrespo n d  to  th e  d a te  w hen  th e  household  app lied  to  th e  p ro gram . S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.8: Effect o f A FA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t, L ocal L inear R egression  E s tim a te s
N otes: T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses o f h eads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  period  Jan u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  colum ns co rrespond  to  d ifferent specifications of th e  b a n d w id th  — th e  ranges o f th e  elig ib ility  score from  w hich th e  households were selected . T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym ent w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . P anels A an d  B p resen t es tim ate s  from  th e  regression  d isco n tinu ity  m odel w ith o u t covariates an d  w ith  covariates, respectively. T h e  e s tim a tio n  uses a  local linear regression  w ith  a  tr ia n g u la r  kernel d en sity  fu n c tio n  o n  each  side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . In  co lum ns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), an d  (11) th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym en t in  th e  p o s t-ap p lica tio n  p eriod . In  co lum ns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), an d  (12) th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent in  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . R eg istered  em ploym en t is m easured  as an  in d ica to r variab le equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  a re  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  g iven ca len d ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  covariates in  th e  regressions in  P an el B include gender, h ead  of th e  household  s ta tu s , age, m arita l s ta tu s , ed u ca tio n a l level (in  3 ca tegories), th e  n u m b er o f ch ild ren  aged 0-17 in  th e  household , w h e th er th e  household  was enrolled  in  th e  PA N E S p ro gram , residence in  M ontevideo (U ru g u ay ’s cap ita l), an d  w heth er th e  in d iv idu a l was a  reg istered  em ployee. All covariates co rrespond  to  th e  d a te  w hen  th e  household  app lied  to  th e  p ro gram . S ta n d a rd  errors c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.9: Effect of A FA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t, A lte rn a tiv e  S ta n d a rd  E rro rs
N otes: T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses o f h eads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  period  Jan u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  colum ns co rrespond  to  d ifferent specifications of th e  b a n d w id th  — th e  ranges o f th e  elig ib ility  score from  w hich th e  households were selected . T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym ent w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social Security  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . In  co lum ns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), an d  (11) th e  d ep en d e n t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym en t in  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod . In  co lum ns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), an d  (12) th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym en t in  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . R eg istered  em ploym ent is m easu red  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca len d ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. A ll rows an d  colum ns re p o rt th e  coefficient o n  th e  AFAM  eligibility  in d ica to r, equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if scorei> 0), an d  zero  o therw ise. T h e  rows co rrespo n d  to  different c rite ria  to  co m p u te  cluste red  s ta n d a rd  errors: a t  in d iv idu a l level or a t  household  level. P an el A p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . P an el B p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side o f cutoff. T h e  covariates in  th e  regressions include gender, h ead  of th e  household  s ta tu s , age, m arita l s ta tu s , ed u ca tio n a l level (in  3 ca tegories), th e  n u m b er o f ch ild ren  aged 0-17 in  th e  household , w h e th er th e  household  was enrolled  in  th e  PA N ES p rogram , residence in  M ontevideo (U rug uay ’s ca p ita l), an d  w he th er th e  in d iv idu a l was a  reg istered  em ployee. All covariates co rrespond  to  th e  d a te  w hen  th e  household  app lied  to  th e  p rogram . * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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A .3 .4  R ob u stn ess o f th e  R egression  D iscon tin u ity /D ifferen ce-in -D ifferen ce  (R D -D D ) R esu lts
T a b le  A .10 : E ffec t o f  A F A M  E lig ib il i ty  o n  R e g is te re d  E m p lo y m e n t , R D -D D  E s t im a te s  fo r  A l te r n a t iv e  B a n d w id th s
N otes: T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of h eads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e o f th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h e  co lum ns co rrespo n d  to  d ifferent specifications of th e  b a n d w id th  — th e  rang es o f th e  elig ib ility  score from  w hich th e  households were selected . T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym ent w ork h isto ries for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . T h e  d ep en d en t variab le is registered  em ploym ent, m easu red  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if  th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym en t for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a g iven ca len d ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. “E lig ib le” is a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if score{> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. “P o st A p p ” is a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  observa tio n  o ccurred  in  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum ns (1), (3), (5), (7), (9), an d  (11) include covariates; w hile co lum ns (2), (4), (6), (8), (10), an d  (12) adds m o n th  fixed effects. E stim a te s  in  P an el A include a  q u a d ra tic  elig ib ility  score po lynom ial in te ra c te d  w ith  th e  eligible an d  p o s t ap p lic a tio n  p eriod  in d ica to rs , an d  in  P an el B include a  linear elig ib ility  score po lynom ial in te ra c te d  w ith  th e  eligible an d  p o s t ap p lic a tio n  p eriod  ind ica to rs . T h e  covariates in  th e  regressions include gender, h ead  of th e  household  s ta tu s , age, m arita l s ta tu s , ed u ca tio n a l level (in  3 ca tegories), th e  n u m b er o f ch ild ren  aged 0-17 in  th e  household , w h e th er th e  household  was enrolled  in  th e  PA N E S p rogram , residence in  M ontevideo (U ru g u ay ’s ca p ita l), an d  w h e th er th e  in d iv idu a l w as a  reg istered  em ployee. All covariates co rrespond  to  th e  d a te  w hen  th e  household  app lied  to  th e  p ro gram . T h e  colum ns co rrespond  to  different specifications of th e  b an d w id th . S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
A .3 .5  R ob u stn ess o f th e  D istr ib u tion a l E ffects o f A FA M  on R egistered  
E m ploym ent
Table A.11: Determinants of Propensity to be a Registered Employee
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.2 ;+ 0 .2 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  of th e  d a ta ) . T h e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easu red  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym en t for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. A ll in d iv id u a l/h o u seh o ld  ch a rac te ris tic s  p resen ted  in  th is  ta b le  are  m easured  a t  th e  d a te  o f ap p lic a tio n  o r before, i.e. before th e  a d m in is tra tiv e  decision  on  en ro llm en t to  th e  p ro gram . H u b er-W h ite  ro b u st s ta n d a rd  erro rs  in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
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T able  A.12: Effect of AFA M  E lig ib ility  on  R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t by  P ro p e n s ity  to  be a  R eg iste red
E m ployee -  R ange of [-0.02; 0.02] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 2 ; +0.02] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial e s tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for ineligible ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
XViii
T able  A.13: Effect of A FA M  on R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t C hange by P ro p e n s ity  to  be  a  R eg iste red
E m ployee -  R ange of [-0.05; 0.05] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 5 ; +0.05] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p erio d , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for ineligible ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.14: Effect of A FA M  on R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t C hange by P ro p e n s ity  to  be  a  R eg iste red
E m ployee -  R ange of [-0.15; 0.15] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .1 5 ; +0.15] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p erio d , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for ineligible ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  p aren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.15: Effect of A FA M  on R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t C hange by P ro p e n s ity  to  be  a  R eg iste red
E m ployee -  R ange of [-0.2; 0.2] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.2 ;+ 0 .2 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial e s tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for ineligible ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.16: Effect of A FA M  on R eg iste red  E m p loy m en t C hange by P ro p e n s ity  to  be  a  R eg iste red
E m ployee -  R ange of [-0.073; 0.073] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score (O p tim a l B an d w id th )
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  J a n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [-0 .07 3 ; +0.073] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespo n d  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variable , an  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. P anels  A, B an d  C p resen t th e  regression  e s tim ate s  for th e  subgroups o f in d iv iduals w ith  Low, M edium  an d  H igh p red ic ted  p ro p en sity  to  w ork as a  reg istered  em ployee, respectively . See S ection  7 for a  deta iled  ex p lan a tio n  of th e  p ro ced u re  to  d e te rm in e  th ese  p red ic ted  p ro bab ilities . T h e  firs t row  in  each  of th e  P anels p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod , w hereas th e  second row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p re -ap p lica tio n  p eriod . C olum n  (1) p resen ts  re su lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n (2) p resen ts  resu lts  from  a  linear R D  p olyn om ial es tim ated  sep ara te ly  on  e ith er side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for ineligible ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n (4) re p o rts  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  of th e  m ean  o f th e  d ep en den t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n um b er of observations, w hich co rrespo n d  to  24,563 ind iv idu a ls  for up to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m o n ths an d  37 p re -ap p lic a tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs  c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** sign ifican t a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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A .3 .6  R ob u stn ess o f th e  E ffects o f A FA M  on D ifferent M argins of 
P artic ip ation
Table A.17: The Effect of AFAM on Different Margins of Participation -  Alternative Polynomial Models
N otes: T h e  resu lts  in  th is  ta b le  are  based  o n  th e  “Follow-Up S am p le ,” w hich includes heads o f households an d  spouses o f h eads of households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  o f th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010. T h is  sam ple co rresponds to  th e  sub se t of ind iv idu a ls  w ho were in terv iew ed  for th e  p ro g ram ’s follow-up survey  d urin g  th e  p eriod  S ep tem ber 201-F ebruary  2013. T h e  su rv ey ’s sam ple was d raw n  from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [-0 .04 26 ; +0.0727] o f th e  elig ib ility  score (see S ection  4 .3 for m ore d e ta ils). T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  from  th e  p ro g ram ’s follow-up survey  d a ta  (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  no tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  th e  firs t row, th e  d ep en den t variab le  is th e  reg istered  em ploym ent s ta tu s  as re p o rted  by  th e  in d iv idu a l la t th e  tim e  of th e  in terv iew  (one if she is w orking as a  reg istered  em ployee, zero o therw ise). In  th e  second row, th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is non-em ploym en t ag a in  as re p o rted  by th e  in d iv idu a l a t  th e  tim e  of th e  in terv iew , w hich is equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l is n o t w orking, an d  equal to  zero if she is w orking (as a  reg istered  o r as a  n on-reg istered  em ployee). In  th e  th ird  row, th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is in form al em ploym en t a t  th e  tim e  o f th e  in terv iew , w hich  is equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l is w orking as a n  in fo rm al (o r n on-reg istered ) em ployee, an d  zero o therw ise (i.e., w orking as a  reg istered  em ployee o r n o t w orking). E ach  of th ese  rows p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  no tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro gram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if  scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  fo u rth  row  p resen ts  th e  p-value o f th e  te s t th a t  th e  coefficients for th e  “N on -E m p lo ym en t” an d  “In fo rm al E m p lo y m en t” regressions a re  jo in tly  equal to  zero. C olum ns (1) th ro u g h  (4) p resen t resu lts  based  o n  linear, q u a d ra tic , cubic, an d  q u a rtic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er o f observations. H u b e r-W h ite  ro b u st s ta n d a rd  erro rs in  p aren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** significant a t  1%.
XXiii
A .3 .7  R ob u stn ess o f H eterogen eou s E ffects by Socio-E conom ic G roups
T able  A.18: H eterogeneous Effects of AFA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub -G ro up s -  R ange
of [-0.02; 0.02] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
Polynomial Order
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 2 ; +0.02] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for u p  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
T able  A.19: H eterogeneous Effects of AFA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub -G ro up s -  R ange
of [-0.05; 0.05] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
Polynomial Order
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .0 5 ; +0.05] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for u p  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.20: H eterogeneous Effects of AFA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub -G ro up s -  R ange
of [-0.15; 0.15] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
Polynomial Order
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  range of [-0 .1 5 ; +0.15] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for up  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  p aren theses. * sign ifican t a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.21: H eterogeneous Effects of AFA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub -G ro up s -  R ange
of [-0.2; 0.2] of th e  E lig ib ility  Score
Polynomial Order
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.2 ;+ 0 .2 ] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for u p  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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T able  A.22: H eterogeneous Effects of AFA M  E lig ib ility  by  S ocio-D em ographic  S ub -G ro up s -  R ange
of [-0.073; 0.073] o f th e  E lig ib ility  Score (O p tim a l B an d w id th )
Polynomial Order
N o tes : T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads o f households an d  spouses of heads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of th e  AFAM  ap p lic a tio n  d u rin g  th e  p eriod  J a n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  o f [-0 .07 3 ; +0.073] o f th e  eligibility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atched  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h isto ries  for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records (see S ection  4.4 for a  d e ta iled  d escrip tio n  o f th e  d a ta ) . E ach  row  p resen ts  th e  regression  e s tim ate s  from  th e  basic m odel in  E q u a tio n  (2) w ith  covariates a t  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  th e  p ro g ram  as in  th e  n o tes  to  T ab le  3. T h e  regressions a re  es tim ated  as linear p ro b ab ility  m odels. In  colum ns (1) an d  (2), th e  d ep en d en t variab le  is reg istered  em ploym ent, m easured  as a n  in d ica to r variab le  equal to  one if th e  SSA records in d ica te  th a t  th e re  are  social secu rity  co n trib u tio n s  from  em ploym ent for th e  in d iv idu a l in  a  given ca lend ar m onth , an d  zero o therw ise. T h e  coefficients co rrespond  to  th e  “E lig ib le” variab le , a n  in d ica to r equal to  one if  th e  in d iv idu a l belongs to  a  household  eligible for th e  p ro g ram  accord ing  to  th e  AFAM  elig ib ility  ru les (i.e., if 
scorei> 0), an d  zero o therw ise. E ach  row  p resen ts  re su lts  for reg istered  em ploym ent d u rin g  th e  p o s t-a p p lica tio n  p eriod  for th e  co rresponding  subgroup . C olum n (1) p resen ts  resu lts  based  o n  a  q u a d ra tic  R D  p olyn om ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  on  e ith e r side of th e  elig ib ility  th re sh o ld . C olum n  (2) p resen ts  re su lts  from  a  linear R D  polynom ial es tim a te d  sep ara te ly  o n  e ith e r side o f cutoff. C olum n  (3) re p o rts  th e  m ean  for each  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  ( th e  con tro l g roup). C olum n  (4) re p o rts  th e  p ro g ram ’s effect from  th e  q u a d ra tic  R D  polynom ial m odel (C o lum n 1) as a  p ercen tage  o f th e  m ean  of th e  d ep en d en t variab le  for inelig ib le ind iv idu a ls  (C o lu m n  3). C olum n  (5) re p o rts  th e  to ta l  n u m b er of observations, w hich co rrespond  to  24,563 in d iv iduals for u p  to  54 p o s t-a p p lica tio n  m onths. S ta n d a rd  erro rs c luste red  a t  th e  in d iv idu a l level in  paren theses. * significant a t  10%; ** significant a t  5%; *** sign ifican t a t  1%.
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A .4  A dditional R esults: F igures
A .4 .1  T im ing o f A p p lication  to  A FA M
F ig u re  A .1 : D is t r ib u t io n  o f H o u se h o ld s  b y  A F A M  A p p lic a t io n  D a te ,  J a n u a r y  2008 to  D e c e m b e r  
2009
Notes: The sample corresponds to the entire population of applicant households with adults aged 18 to 57 at the time of the AFAM application during the period January 2008 to September 2010. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010). The outcome variable is date of application to AFAM defined as the month and year of household application date.
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A .4 .2  B alance F igures for B aselin e C haracteristics
Figure A.2: Covariates RD Plots
a) Female applicant (%)
c) Female head (within heads) (%)
e) Married/in couple (%)
b) Household head (%)
d) Age at AFAM application
f) Missing married/in couple: (%)
N o tes : T hese  figures p lo t p re -ap p lica tio n  ch a rac te ris tic s  ag a in s t th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads of house­holds an d  spouses of heads of households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM  d u rin g  th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1] o f th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010). T h e  elig ib ility  score is s tan d ard ized  so th a t  th e  eligibility  th re sh o ld  is zero, w ith  positive  scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  eligible households an d  neg ative  scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  inelig ib le households. E ach  p o in t (b lue circle) in  th e  p lo t rep resen ts  th e  average value o f th e  ou tcom e variab le  in  elig ib ility  score b ins w ith  a  w id th  one h a lf  o f a  p ercen tage  p o in t. T h e  red  solid line p lo ts  p red ic ted  values from  a  second degree po lynom ial m odel e s tim a te d  a t  each  side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . “Coef.” re p o rts  th e  es tim ated  coefficient (and  its  co rresponding  s ta n d a rd  erro r in  p aren thesis) from  a  q u a d ra tic  p o lyn om ial R D  regression  w ith o u t ad d itio n a l covariates.
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Figure A.3: Covariates RD Plots
e) Secondary or more (%) f) Missing education (%)
N o tes : T hese  figures p lo t p re -ap p lica tio n  ch a rac te ris tic s  ag a in s t th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads of house­holds an d  spouses of heads of households aged 18 to  57 a t  th e  tim e  of ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM  d u rin g  th e  period  Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [—0.1 ;+ 0 .1] o f th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  records (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010). T h e  elig ib ility  score is s tan d ard ized  so th a t  th e  eligibility  th re sh o ld  is zero, w ith  p ositive scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  eligible households an d  neg ative  scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  inelig ib le households. E ach  p o in t (b lue circle) in  th e  p lo t rep resen ts  th e  average value o f th e  ou tcom e variab le  in  elig ib ility  score b ins w ith  a  w id th  one h a lf  o f a  p ercen tage  p o in t. T h e  red  solid line p lo ts  p red ic ted  values from  a  second degree po lynom ial m odel e s tim a te d  a t  each  side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . “C oef" re p o rts  th e  es tim ated  coefficient (and  its  co rresponding  s ta n d a rd  erro r in  paren thesis) from  a  q u a d ra tic  po lynom ial R D  regression  w ith o u t ad d itio n a l covariates.
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F ig u re  A .4 : C o v a r ia te s  R D  P lo ts
a) Enrolled in PANES (%)
b) Montevideo (capital city) (%)
c) Employed before application (%)
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Coef.= -0.017 
(0.023)
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E lig ib ility  S co re
Notes: These figures plot pre-application characteristics against the eligibility score. The sample corresponds to heads of house­holds and spouses of heads of households aged 18 to 57 at the time of application to AFAM during the period January 2008 to September 2010, from households within a range of [—0.1;+0.1] of the eligibility score. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010). The eligibility score is standardized so that the eligibility threshold is zero, with positive scores indicating individuals in eligible households and negative scores indicating individuals in ineligible households. Each point (blue circle) in the plot represents the average value of the outcome variable in eligibility score bins with a width one half of a percentage point. The red solid line plots predicted values from a second degree polynomial model estimated at each side of the eligibility threshold. “Coef" reports the estimated coefficient (and its corresponding standard error in parenthesis) from a quadratic polynomial RD regression without additional covariates.
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A .4 .3  B alance F igure for th e  P red icted  R eg istered  E m ploym ent R ate
Figure A.5: RD Plot for Predicted Registered Employment
N o tes : T h is  figure p lo ts  p red ic ted  reg istered  em ploym en t ag a in s t th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  sam ple co rresponds to  heads of households an d  spouses of h eads o f households aged 18 to  57 a t th e  tim e  o f ap p lic a tio n  to  AFAM  d u rin g  th e  period  Jan u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010, from  households w ith in  a  rang e  of [-0 .1 ; +0.1] o f th e  elig ib ility  score. T h e  d a ta se t co rresponds to  th e  AFAM  baseline ap p lic a tio n  reco rds (Ja n u a ry  2008 to  S ep tem ber 2010) m atch ed  w ith  th e  reg istered  em ploym en t w ork h istories for th e  period  J a n u a ry  2005 to  D ecem ber 2012 from  th e  Social S ecurity  A d m in is tra tio n ’s a d m in is tra tiv e  records. T h e  registered  em ploym en t m easure is p red ic ted  using th e  ch a rac te ris tic s  in  T ab le  2 an d  p re -perio d  reg istered  em ploym en t d a ta . T h e  eligibility  score is s tan d ard ized  so th a t  th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld  is zero, w ith  p ositive scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  eligible househo lds and  neg ative  scores in d ica tin g  ind iv idu a ls  in  ineligible households. E ach  p o in t (b lue circle) in  th e  p lo t rep resen ts  th e  average value o f th e  ou tcom e variab le  in  elig ib ility  score b ins w ith  a  w id th  one h a lf o f a  p ercen tage  p o in t. T h e  red  solid line p lo ts  p red ic ted  values from  a  second degree po lynom ial m odel es tim a te d  a t  each  side o f th e  elig ib ility  th resh o ld . “C oef" re p o rts  th e  es tim ated  coefficient (and  its  co rresponding  s ta n d a rd  erro r in  paren thesis) from  a  q u a d ra tic  po lynom ial R D  regression  w ith o u t ad d itio n a l covariates.
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A .4 .4 M cC rary Test
F ig u re  A .6 : D is t r ib u t io n  o f  th e  A ss ig n m e n t V a r ia b le  a n d  th e  M c C ra ry  T e s t
a) Eligibility Score (Assignment Variable)
b) M cCrary’s Density Test
Notes: The sample corresponds to the entire population of applicant households with adults aged 18 to 57 at the time of the AFAM application during the period January 2008 to September 2010. The dataset corresponds to the AFAM baseline application records (January 2008 to September 2010). Figure a shows the histogram of the eligibility score distribution in bins with a width one percentage point. Figure b plots the eligibility score density in bins with a width one half of a percentage point. The solid red line plots predicted values from a local linear regression (with a width one half of a percentage point) with separate score trends estimated either side of the eligibility threshold. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. The bandwidth is chosen using the Imbens-Kalyanaraman bandwidth selection rule (2012), and we use a rectangular kernel.
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